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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses Norwegian media’s coverage of the war in Afghanistan in 
light of the communication strategy of the Norwegian Armed Forces. The 
thesis focuses on the coverage produced while the journalists have visited the 
Norwegian military in Afghanistan, either through “media visits” or 
“embedding”. The analysis include both articles from Norwegian newspapers 
and the documentary “Norge i krig – Oppdrag Afghanistan”. In order to 
provide a thorough analysis of the coverage and the communication tools 
employed by the Norwegian Armed Forces, the study consists of both a 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis, in addition to semi-structured 
interviews. The empirical dataset shows that although the journalists leave 
behind several of the ethical norms of journalism, the coverage reflects only 
some of the communication goals of the Norwegian Armed Forces. The thesis 
argues that this can partially be explained by a lack of sophistication and 
precision in the communication conducted by the Norwegian Armed Forces. 
Moreover, the findings have consequences for the theories of media-state 
relations developed by Maxwell McCombs (2004) and W. Lance Bennett 
(1990). Based on the empirical data, it is argued that both the ethical norms of 
journalism and the sophistication of the communication made by the source 
should be addressed when explaining what factors influence the media agenda. 
This will arguably provide a more applicable theoretical framework for 
understanding the complexities of media-state relations. 
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Preface 
 
I am a practicing journalist, and I have always been fascinated by individuals 
who travel to the frontline to report on the realities of war. They are hailed as 
mystic heroes by the readers and put themselves in great danger to provide 
crucial information for the public at home. But at one point I started asking 
myself: To what extent do the media report independently and critically? Are 
there other influential actors trying to “direct the theatre of war”? This 
triggered other intriguing questions: What is the role of the military itself in all 
of this? And to what extent are they able to communicate their intended 
message through the media? This curiosity inspired me to start working on a 
thesis on the relationship between the media and the Norwegian Armed Forces, 
and it is my hope that the research will provide some new insight into the 
realities of communication and media in times of war.  
 In the university program Peace and Conflict, we are encouraged to 
write within our own academic discipline. For me as a journalist, this has 
resulted in a thesis within the field of media and communication. However, to 
increase the inter-disciplinary relevance of this thesis, and make use of the 
multidisciplinary nature of the program, I have written a thesis that also draws 
upon social science-theories addressing media-state relations. 
I have a full time job in the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet. However, 
it is important to stress that I have not worked closely as a journalist with 
Norway’s engagement in Afghanistan. I have great respect for the reporters 
who report from the frontline. Because I have never covered an armed conflict, 
I am humble when embarking on the task of analysing media’s coverage from 
Afghanistan. Also, I find it necessary to emphasise that potential criticism is 
directed more towards the editors in charge, than the individual journalists. 
There are many people that have contributed to this thesis. To them, I 
am forever grateful. First, I would like to thank my supervisor Henrik Thune 
for his good advice, patience and commitment to my research. It has been a 
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pleasure working with you. Second, I want to thank my mother for her care and 
encouragements during both the ups and downs of writing this thesis. I am 
equally grateful to my father for his highly valuable scholarly as well as 
fatherly, advice. I also owe great gratitude to the Norwegian Armed Forces, 
and Petter Hallvard Foght Lindqvist in particular, for their availability and 
facilitation. Moreover, I would like to thank the journalists I have interviewed 
for their will to participate. Finally, I want to thank all of my fellow PECOS-
students at Blindern for making these two and a half years memorable and 
highly valued. 
This being said, the responsibility of the 33.000 words in this thesis is 
mine and mine alone. All translations from Norwegian to English are made by 
the author.  
 
Peder Ottosen 
Oslo, November 10. 2011 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 Information and communication in modern warfare 
Following the multiple terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11. 2001, the 
battle for the so-called hearts and minds of the people has been attributed an 
increasingly important role in the “theatre” of war. Phillip M. Taylor argues 
that, today “it is essential for the eventual victor to win the moral high ground 
in the public domain on a global scale – and not just in the short term.  In other 
words, they also need to win the ‘propaganda war’” (Taylor 2002:16). Relevant 
for the application of theories on communication and warfare, it is not only 
scholars who emphasise the importance of winning the battle for hearts and 
minds. Governments and military organisations have recognized this as well. In 
the “Information Operations Roadmap Charter”, published in 2003 by Donald 
H. Rumsfeld and the American Department of Defence, it is stated that 
information is now “critical to military success and will only become more so 
in the foreseeable future”  (American Department of Defence 2003:3). The role 
of information has also been emphasised with regards to the war in 
Afghanistan. In the “Initial Assessment” (2009), the Commander of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General McChrystal, analyse 
the challenges ISAF face in Afghanistan, and what measures needs to be taken. 
One of the issues he addresses is the role of the information domain as a battle 
space: “[I]t is one in which ISAF must take aggressive actions to win the 
important battle of perception” (McChrystal 2009:40). Interestingly, it was 
General McChrystal’s critical statements to the media regarding President 
Barack Obama and his administration that finally cost him his job as ISAF-
commander (NBC June 23. 2010).  
It is evident that information and perception-management has become a 
vital aspect of any war, and as a consequence the Norwegian Armed Forces 
have developed a specific communication strategy for Afghanistan in 2011. An 
important aim in the communication strategy is to rally support and 
2 
understanding for the “role and tasks” of the Norwegian Armed Forces 
(Norwegian Armed Forces 2011).
1
 In June 2010, a road bomb killed four 
Norwegian soldiers in Afghanistan, a tragedy that once again fuelled the public 
debate regarding Norway’s engagement in Afghanistan. One way for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces to obtain domestic public support and understanding 
is through media’s coverage (Schiager 2011:92-93), and they apply several 
tools in order to do this. Chief of communication at the Norwegian Joint 
Headquarters of the Norwegian Armed Forces, Petter Hallvard Foght 
Lindqvist, explains that among the tools employed are arrangements that allow 
the media to visit and meet Norwegian soldiers in Afghanistan, two of the most 
important being “media visits” and so-called “embedding”.2 The term “media 
visits” is here understood as trips where journalists are invited to, or request to 
visit, Norwegian Armed Forces’ bases in Afghanistan.  A more extensive 
version of these media visits is “embedding”. Lindqvist explains that through 
embedding, journalists join a military unit on their operative missions in the 
“theatre”. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
Due to the significance attributed to the relationship between information, 
media and warfare described above, the topic constitutes an important area of 
research within the discipline of Peace and Conflict. There exists a vast amount 
of research literature on media content and media effects on both the public and 
on governmental policies in times of war and crises. Yet, less attention has 
been directed to what factors influence the media coverage in general 
(McCombs 2004:118), and, more specifically, how the military and 
governmental officials relates to, and affects, the “media agenda” in times of 
war (Borchgrevink 2010:10; Gervin 2004:9). Some research has been 
conducted on how embedding affects the domestic war coverage in countries 
                                                 
1
 I have obtained a copy of the communication strategy, and permitted to use it freely. 
However, because it is not an official document, it will not be attached in the appendix. 
2
 Telephone-interview with Petter Hallvard Foght Lindqvist (June 7. June 12. and July 22. 
2011). All later citations of Lindqvist derive from these interviews.   
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like the U.S. and the Netherlands. In Norway, research has analysed the nature 
of the Norwegian Afghanistan coverage in general, one example being Kristin 
Nordby (2009), and how the relationship between the Norwegian Armed 
Forces and Norwegian journalists affects the presentation of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces in the media (Schiager 2011). In addition, Eivind Solberg-
Hansen Fondenes has provided a comparative analysis of Norwegian media’s 
coverage of military and civilian victims (2011). 
However, there exists no literature that analyses the coverage conducted 
solely by journalists embedded with the Norwegian Armed Forces in 
Afghanistan, or by journalists on media visits to the Norwegian military bases. 
Moreover, Norwegian media’s Afghanistan coverage has not been analysed in 
light of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ communication strategy. This thesis sets 
out to narrow this knowledge gap, and seeks to answer three research 
questions. 
 
First, the thesis aims to answer two empirical questions: 
 
What characterises the Norwegian media coverage produced on 
“media visits” or while “embedded” in Afghanistan? 
 
To what extent does the media coverage fulfil the expressed goals of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces’ communication strategy? 
 
Building from these questions, the thesis will then seek to answer the 
following analytical question: 
 
What do the empirical findings say about the media-state relation, 
and what are the theoretical implications for the academic debate? 
 
These are important questions because the communication strategy, as well as 
the subsequent media coverage, play a central role in the Norwegian Armed 
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Forces’ battle for the “hearts and minds” of the public at home and abroad. 
Afghanistan has been chosen as a case because it is Norway’s single most 
extensive military operation today. At the beginning of 2011, 528 soldiers were 
deployed in Afghanistan (Norwegian Department of Defence 2011:34). 
Moreover, it is an operation that has been given massive media attention over 
the last ten years, and is often described as Norway’s most important military 
effort post World War II (Norwegian Armed Forces 2011). 
The analysis will allow for a discussion on what role such tools as media 
visits and embedding play in fulfilling the goals of the strategy, and how 
successful the Norwegian Armed Forces are in communicating their messages. 
The analysis also carries significance as it can help to increase our 
understanding of the journalistic process when covering war. Journalists are 
intended to serve as critical “watchdogs” that inform the public and create 
debate, and are thus one of the most important institutions in a democratic 
society (Norsk Presseforbund 2005). Analysing the characteristics of the 
coverage will provide a possible basis for discussing how journalists carry out 
this role. When including the perspectives of both the military and the media, it 
is the aim of this thesis also to discuss the potential theoretical implications for 
the relationship between the two. 
 
1.3 Answering the research questions 
In order to answer the research questions, a quantitative content analysis will 
be conducted. It will analyse Norwegian newspapers’ coverage of Afghanistan 
in the last six months of 2010 and the first six months of 2011, focusing on the 
coverage that has been produced while the journalists have been either 
embedded or on media visits. The first research question will be analysed 
through an empirical study of relevant characteristics of the coverage and to 
what extent those characteristics are in line with the ethical norms of 
journalism. With regards to the second research question, the communication 
strategy of the Norwegian Armed Forces for Afghanistan 2011 will be 
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employed as a comparative element. The thesis identifies four specific goals of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces’ communication strategy:  
 
1. Communicate the cooperation and mentoring of Afghan security forces. 
2. Communicate the importance of a broad international effort. 
3. Promote and explain the Norwegian Armed Forces’ tasks and competence. 
4. Downplay combat actions. 
 
These goals will be operationalized into four variables that seek to identify to 
what extent the four goals are fulfilled through the coverage.  
In order to sophisticate the analysis, the quantitative analysis will be 
supplemented with a qualitative content analysis of the documentary “Norge i 
krig – Oppdrag Afghanistan”, as well as semi-structured interviews with both 
journalists and a representative of the Norwegian Armed Forces.
3
  
It is important to note that the media at times supplement the coverage 
produced on media visits or while embedded, with news items produced in 
Norway or elsewhere. However, as it is the goal of this thesis to increase our 
knowledge of the role of media visits and embedding exclusively, such news 
items will not be included in the analysis. 
 With regards to the third research question, the empirical findings will 
be applied in a broader generic and theoretical discussion. The theoretical 
framework of this thesis is based upon Maxwell McCombs’ (2004) seminal 
theory of media agenda-setting. To help increase our understanding of the 
process of agenda-setting and media-state relations, the ethical norms of 
Norwegian journalism (Norsk Presseforbund 2005) and Lance Bennett’s theory 
of indexing (1990) will be incorporated into this theoretical framework. 
The aim of the thesis is not to prove causality, as implied by McCombs’ 
theory. There are too many extraneous variables that could influence the causal 
                                                 
3
 In addition to the semi-structured interviews, the thesis will draw upon data from a survey 
conducted by Respons Analyse (2011). The survey is based upon structured interviews with 
500 employees in the Norwegian Armed Forces, as well as 500 journalists, regarding the 
relationship between journalists and the Norwegian Armed Forces. 
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link between a dependent and independent variable, thus jeopardizing the 
validity of the research (Bryman 2008:156). Moreover, with regards to media 
content, it is problematic to claim that there is one single variable causing the 
coverage. A reporter is influenced by many factors, such as personal beliefs 
and biases, editors and audience, and the environment in which he reports from 
(Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Engen, 2006). Thus, it can be argued that it 
would be counter-productive to claim a clear causal link between the 
Norwegian Armed Forces and the media coverage. 
Regardless of the discrepancy between the theory and the 
methodological approach employed in the thesis with regards to causality, 
McCombs’ theory of media agenda-setting provides a highly valuable tool in 
interpreting the results of the analysis. It includes all the relevant factors that 
will be studied in the thesis, and provides a framework for understanding how 
these factors relate to each other. Moreover, it will be interesting to discuss the 
empirical results of this study in light of the causality argued by McCombs’ 
theory.
 4
 
 The three research questions will be operationalised into three 
hypotheses. These hypotheses derive from the dominant theories of media-state 
relations applied in this study. In order to provide the necessary foundation for 
the hypotheses, they will be presented in chapter 3 after having thoroughly 
established the theoretical framework of the thesis.  
 
1.4 Outline of thesis  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides a background 
context of the topic at hand. It describes the historical development of media 
and warfare in Norway, and the relationship between the media and the 
government.  
                                                 
4
 The potential impact media-coverage can have on the public opinion, and the potential 
influence the public opinion exerts on the coverage, will not be analysed. This would require 
a very different research design and theoretical approach, including media effects and 
perception analysis. However, as an interesting backdrop to the thesis, recent research 
indicates that 94% of the Norwegian public receives knowledge about the Norwegian Armed 
Forces from the media (Synovate 2011:15). 
7 
 
Chapter 3 places the study within a larger theoretical perspective. Additionally, 
it provides the theoretical framework of the thesis, and explains how Maxwell 
McCombs’ theory of media agenda-setting will be applied to the study at hand.  
 
In Chapter 4, the methodological approach of the thesis will be explained. The 
chapter describes how the quantitative and qualitative content analysis, in 
addition to the semi-structured interviews, will be employed in answering the 
research questions. It will also address the quality of the methodological 
approach, and some of the methodological challenges of the study. 
 
Chapter 5 will concisely present the findings of the quantitative and qualitative 
content analysis. 
 
Chapter 6 will provide a discussion of the results, and will also include the 
majority of the answers from the semi-structured interviews. This aims to 
provide a deeper and more profound understanding of the empirical data. 
Moreover, the chapter will discuss what the results say about the media-state 
relation, and the subsequent implications for the theoretical framework applied. 
 
In chapter 7, the final conclusions and some recommendations to the media 
and the Norwegian Armed Forces will be presented. Potential opportunities for 
future research will also be described. 
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2.0 Historical background and concepts 
 
2.1 Development of media and warfare in Norway 
When Norway became an independent state in 1905, there was an expectation 
from the Norwegian government that the media would act loyal to Norway’s 
relations to foreign powers (Nilsen and Sjue 1998; Ottosen 2001:198-202). 
Moreover, by as late as 2001, the Norwegian government had a list of 200 
journalists that would volunteer as information officers in the event of war 
(Ottosen 2001:198-202). These features indicate that close links have existed 
between the Norwegian government and journalists, and is further supported by 
Thune et. al. (2006). Based on their own and other’s research, Thune et. al. 
argue that the media coverage of Norwegian foreign policy to a large extent 
communicate and emphasise the arguments and perceptions formulated by the 
politicians or practitioners of the official policies (Thune et. al. 2006:211). One 
of the explanations to this dependence is what has been labelled the 
“consensus-oriented foreign policy” in Norway, where the agreement among 
the political parties historically has determined Norwegian foreign policies. 
Moreover, it is argued that Norwegian media adhere to this consensus, 
resulting in a dependence on official sources (Thune et. al. 2006:211-212).  
Other studies confirm the assumption of Norwegian media’s loyalty to 
the government and the Norwegian Armed Forces also at times of war. An 
analysis of the coverage of the First Gulf War shows that media from NATO-
countries such as Norway and Germany reflected more of the American 
rhetoric than Swedish and Finnish media. A similar difference was found 
during the conflict in Kosovo, where the Swedish press was more critical 
towards the war than the press in Norway and Britain (Ottosen 2001:218-219).  
Furthermore, military organisations invest greater and greater resources 
in affecting the agenda set by the media, the reason being the increasingly 
important role of journalists and media in conflicts (Ottosen 2009:34). In this 
new media environment, where journalists have the capability of covering a 
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war 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and the increasingly important “battle for 
hearts and minds”, NATO has recognized the need to modernise as well. 
Alistair Campell, former press secretary for Labour in Great Britain, has 
emphasised that media operations were vital during the conflict in Kosovo: “In 
this changed media environment, in a modern conflict […] effective 
communication is not merely a legitimate function; it is an essential one” 
(Campell 1999:32 quoted in Gervin 2004:11). Yet, studying the Norwegian 
Armed Forces’ information activity during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, 
Gervin (2004:95) found that the Norwegian Armed Forces had no explicit 
information strategy, and that there were significant differences between the 
Norwegian Armed Forces and the specific information strategy employed by 
NATO. 
 
2.2 Situation today 
The discrepancy between the Norwegian Armed Forces and NATO with 
regards to information and strategies has now been reduced. Today, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces have a communication strategy specifically directed 
at their mission in Afghanistan. The strategy derives from NATO’s 
communication strategy and the political goals of the Norwegian government 
for Afghanistan. Looking at the statistics, it is no mystery why the Norwegian 
Armed Forces are concerned with what the media write about them. According 
to the Norwegian Armed Forces, an overage of 3-400 different media outlets 
write about the Norwegian Armed Forces every day (Schiager 2011:2). But this 
development can also be understood in light of the increased ability of the 
Taliban to perform strategic communication. Since 9/11 the Taliban’s 
communication capabilities have “dramatically” improved, and is today 
characterised by sophisticated technology and vast communication networks 
where information travels with great speed (Foxley 2008 quoted in Bøe Hansen 
2009:52). 
 An increased consciousness towards the role of communication 
strategies is not the only thing that has changed. We have also seen the rise of 
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specific tools intended to fulfil these strategies. As stated in the introduction, 
the thesis will focus on two of the most extensive tools employed to fulfil the 
goals of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ communication strategy, namely media 
visits and embedding. Yet another development is the Norwegian parliament’s 
decision from 2001 to integrate the Chief of Defence and his staff with the 
Ministry of Defence, named Integrated Strategic Management (ISL). 
Consequently, the two information units of the Norwegian Armed Forces and 
the Ministry of defence have been united. Petter Lindqvist explains in the 
interview that this has posed challenges for an organisation that “aims to make 
a distinction between messaging from the military level and messaging from 
the political level, the latter communicating political messages”. 
 
2.2.1 Media visits 
Media visits can be understood as trips where journalists are invited to or 
requests to stay, in the Norwegian Armed Forces’ bases in Afghanistan or other 
destinations where Norwegian troops are located. Lindqvist states that media 
visits to Norwegian bases abroad have been organised by the Norwegian 
Armed Forces for over ten years. The first time it was employed was during the 
war in Bosnia. On such visits journalists can live on the base, learn more about 
the soldiers’ everyday-life, and interview the soldiers and their superiors. The 
thesis will also analyse media visits organised in relation to governmental 
ministers’ trips to the bases. Media visits, arranged by either the Norwegian 
Armed Forces or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are the most common way 
for Norwegian journalists to travel to Afghanistan (Sømme Hammer 2010:58). 
Anders Sømme Hammer has worked as a freelance-journalist in 
Afghanistan since 2007. Having been on several media visits with the 
Norwegian Armed Forces before deciding to work independently in 
Afghanistan, Sømme Hammer explains the mechanisms of media visits in his 
book Drømmekrigen (2010):  
 
11 
Press officers and public relations-agents have prepared everything for 
me. It has always been scheduled time for interviews. And ministers and 
soldiers have posed for the camera in surroundings that clearly show that 
we are in Afghanistan.  
(Sømme Hammer 2010:59)  
 
Statements in the Norwegian Armed Forces’ communication strategy for 
Afghanistan confirm most of Sømme Hammer’s descriptions. On media visits, 
dedicated escort officers are appointed, all interviews must be approved by the 
Norwegian Armed Forces, and all personnel are briefed on media-awareness 
before deployment to Afghanistan (Norwegian Armed Forces 2011). In the 
interview conducted with Kristin Solberg, Aftenposten’s correspondent in 
Afghanistan, she describes how the visits are organised:  
 
It’s a well functioning system. They arrange things for you. It is an 
advantage for the Norwegian Armed Forces that few journalists travel 
outside the camps. They arrive straight from Norway to the bases and 
are met by a smiling Norwegian who tells you about the positive 
military progress. When you don’t leave the bases, you have no reason 
to question that progress.
5
  
 
According to Solberg, media visits are popular arrangements within Norwegian 
media: “I once talked to a press officer who recently had arrived at the base. He 
was surprised by how many requests he had received from Norwegian 
journalists. This surprised me as well.” 
 
2.2.2 Embedding  
A more extensive version of the media visit is embedding. Through 
embedding, journalists are invited not only to stay in the camp, but also to join 
a military unit on their combat operations. A useful definition of embedded-
journalism, a definition also applicable to the Norwegian context, is: “Any 
media journalist contractually registered […] to travel with military units 
                                                 
5
 Telephone-interview with Kristin Solberg, South-Asia correspondent for Aftenposten 
(September 9. 2011). All later citations of Solberg derive from this interview. 
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during combat operations for the purpose of reporting first-hand experiences to 
the media” (Villareal 2005:5). The U.S. Army first employed embedding 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, and it was one of the key features of 
their communication strategy (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies 2008:11; 
Tumber and Palmer 2004:2). During the Falklands war in 1982, the British 
government had failed to appreciate the importance of information in warfare. 
They kept the public ill-informed by suppressing bad news (Carruthers 
2000:129), and they embedded reporters “more or less by accident” (Tumber 
and Palmer 2004:2). Having learnt a lesson from the British mistakes, the U.S. 
Army had an explicit communication strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
2003. The U.S. Department of Defence, through cooperation and dialogue with 
the media outlets, arranged for the journalists to be situated with the different 
troops (Tumber and Palmer 2004:2). 
Despite the success of the program during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces state that it was not until 3-4 years ago that they 
employed embedding as a tool in their communication strategy. In the 
interviews conducted, both Petter Lindqvist and Rune Thomas Ege
6
, former 
press officer in Afghanistan and now a journalist for VG, state that embedding 
was introduced in the Norwegian Armed Forces in 2008. Sømme Hammer 
argues that Norwegian embedding did not commence until 2010.
7
 The different 
views can possibly be a consequence of deviating interpretations of what 
embedding entails. Regardless, when compared to states like the U.S. and the 
Netherlands, the arrangement is less employed and less formalised in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces. Still, Lindqvist states in the interview that 
embedding is regarded by the organisation as a more effective tool in meeting 
the goals of the communication strategy, than a regular media visit. Sømme 
Hammer argues that the goal of the Norwegian Armed Forces when embedding 
journalists, is ”to communicate ‘the soldiers’ war’. It is intended to create 
                                                 
6
 Interview with Rune Thomas Ege, journalist in VG (August 29. 2011). All later citations of 
Ege derive from this interview. 
7
 Telephone-interview with Anders Sømme Hammer, independent journalist (September 12. 
2011). All later citations of Sømme Hammer derive from this interview if not stated otherwise 
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understanding for the soldiers’ experience of war, and their perspectives”. Ege 
has a similar perception, and states that both media visits and embedding is 
intended to show what the Norwegian Armed Forces do: “If the coverage is 
positive, it is a bonus, but they are mostly concerned with the precision of the 
coverage and that the facts presented are correct.” 
  
2.2.3 General features of visits 
Before embedding, or joining a media visit, the journalists must sign a contract 
where they among other things are not allowed to conduct off-record 
interviews and publish classified information such as information about future 
operations or troop strength, capabilities and equipment (ISAF 2011). 
However, Rune Thomas Ege has experienced that on media visits, the 
journalists are most often free to leave the bases and interview the locals. 
Lindqvist explains that during embedding, this is obviously not an option, 
because leaving the troops would constitute a threat for both the journalists and 
the soldiers. Sømme Hammer also states that leaving the camps during media 
visits does not provide the same opportunities to interview the civilians or other 
actors as reporting independently. While Ege and Lindqvist claim that there are 
relatively few constraints besides classified information, Sømme Hammer 
argues in the interview that even on media visits, the Norwegian Armed forces 
control the situation on the bases to a large extent.  
 
All interviews must be cleared by the army, and often you would have 
to go through a press officer. There is absolutely no free access. […] 
Thus, the army has control over where the journalists are at any given 
time, and they know what stories will be published. […] Media visits 
become more like a theatre.  
 
Kristin Solberg has the same perception as Sømme Hammer:  
 
There are many limitations. By visiting the bases you only get the 
military perspective, and if you look at the understanding you develop of 
Afghans and Afghan society, you could almost just as well visit an army 
base back in Norway. Another limitation is that some of the soldiers are 
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off limits, and many of the other soldiers will not tell you the whole 
truth.  
 
Einar Hagvaag, a reporter in Dagbladet, agrees that there are restrictions with 
regards to information that could threaten the security of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces, but that this is information “not relevant for publishing”. However, 
Hagvaag also states that: “What they have managed to keep a secret is exactly 
what the Norwegian special soldiers have done in Afghanistan.”8 
Media visits and embedding can be understood as two examples of 
information subsidies. Sigurd Allern (1997:73) describes information-subsidies 
as “a generous offer of material, the sender usually offers it free of charge and 
expects nothing in return except the publicity achieved if the material is used”. 
Due to limitations in time and resources for the news-organisations, sources 
offer subsidies like financing trips, work-facilities, food and accommodation. 
These commodities are offered by the sources with the aim of communicating a 
certain message to the population (Schiager 2011:16). Oppositely, when 
information is hard to come by, journalists are reluctant to write about a topic 
(Schiager 2011:88). In the case of media visits to the Norwegian Armed 
Forces’ bases, Lindqvist explains that the media often pay for the transport to 
and from Afghanistan, but stay and eat free of charge at the camp. Rune 
Thomas Ege states that VG always pays for their own flights, even when they 
travel with the Norwegian Armed Forces, and that this fee includes food and 
accommodation. Marius Arnesen, a video-reporter for NRK who was 
embedded three times with the Norwegian Armed Forces in the production of 
the documentary “Norge i krig”, states the same: “NRK paid for transport, food 
and accommodation. It has to be like that.”9  However, Sømme Hammer argues 
that this is not the general practice among journalists: “The Norwegian Armed 
Forces finance these trips if the media do not specifically requests otherwise.” 
Kristin Solberg has only been on one media visit, and that was after the four 
                                                 
8
 Interview with Einar Hagvaag, journalist in Dagbladet (September 14. 2011). All later 
citations of Hagvaag derive from this interview. 
9
 Interview with Marius Arnesen, video-journalist in NRK (September 12. 2011). All later 
citations of Arnesen derive from this interview. 
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Norwegian soldiers were killed in the summer of 2010. She informs that as far 
as she knows, the Norwegian Armed Forces paid for her food and 
accommodation the three or four days she spent there. 
 
2.3 Openness in the Norwegian Armed Forces 
When the Norwegian Armed Forces invite journalists to their camps in 
Afghanistan, this should be understood in light of the expressed aim of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces to “open up” to journalists and the public. In 2009, 
statements made by the former chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces, Sverre 
Diesen, encouraged increased openness in the organisation (Borchgrevink 
2010:7). One year later, the new chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces, Harald 
Sunde, communicated the need for a more open media-policy (Sunde quoted in 
Aftenposten January 19. 2010).  
The openness of the Norwegian Armed Forces towards the public and 
the media, or the lack of such openness, has been a widely debated topic 
(Sømme Hammer 2010; Klassekampen September 1. 2010; Hansen in 
Dagbladet June 14. 2011). In an interview with the Norwegian newspaper 
Klassekampen, journalists Fredrik Græsvik and Anders Sømme Hammer argue 
that the intention of increased openness towards the media is a result of the 
need to legitimise their mission in Afghanistan (quoted in Klassekampen 
September 1. 2010). Marius Arnesen, the video-journalist in NRK, explains 
that he was surprised to see how open the army was: “They just wanted to 
show the people back home what was actually happening on the ground. But 
you can always question how well they succeed with being more open.”  
In line with this expressed scepticism, several commentators have 
claimed that in reality, the Norwegian Armed Forces have not changed 
noteworthy, and that only carefully selected information is communicated to 
the media and public. In an open letter published in Dagbladet, union 
representative Thomas Norman Hansen claims that soldiers who express 
discontent receive harsh criticism from their superiors afterwards (Hansen in 
Dagbladet June 14. 2011). Interviews conducted with 500 Norwegian officers 
16 
in 2011 also indicate that there are limitations to the openness in the Norwegian 
Armed Forces. On the question “how should the military leadership relate to 
the media during warfare?”, only 8 per cent of the respondents answered that 
“media should be allowed to work without constraints”, whereas 83 per cent 
answered that they should be offered to join the troops given that agreements 
had been made (Respons Analyse 2011). Furthermore, in Harald Bonaventura 
Borchgrevink’s analysis of the discrepancy between the media’s wish for 
openness and the Norwegian Armed Forces’ need for secrecy regarding the 
international operations in Afghanistan, he found that the Norwegian Armed 
Forces facilitates information that portrays the organisation in a positive light, 
while the secrecy regarding special operations leads to a suspicious attitude 
towards the organisation (Borchgrevink 2010:127).  
The stated goal of the Norwegian Armed Forces to open up to the 
public, and the subsequent debate regarding their “actual” openness, constitutes 
an important backdrop when studying the relationship between the 
communication strategy and the media coverage. 
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3.0 Theoretical framework 
 
Analytical approaches based on content analysis have on occasion been 
criticised for being non-theoretical. The critics argue that the focus is directed 
at what is being measured, rather than the theoretical significance of the 
findings (Bryman 2008:291). There is no secret that the empirical data itself 
constitutes the core of any content analysis, and this applies to the thesis at 
hand as well. However, as Bryman argues, the method does not need to be non-
theoretical if the data is placed in a context of relevant ideas and concepts such 
as power. To avoid the pitfalls of downplaying the importance of theory, and to 
broaden the analytical scope of the empirical study, the thesis will analyse the 
results in light of McCombs’ theory of media agenda-setting (2004), Lance 
Bennett’s so-called indexing-hypothesis, the communication strategy of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces (2011), and the ethical framework of the Norwegian 
media (Norsk Presseforbund 2005). Before arriving at the theoretical 
foundation of this thesis, the next section will provide a brief literature review 
of the development of relevant theories addressing media, governments and 
power. This will help to conceptualize the theoretical approach of the thesis, 
and provide insight into the different theories developed within this area of 
research. 
 
3.1 Media, governments and power
10
 
As a result of the technological advances of the news media and their ability to 
cover war and conflict in real time, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, scholars in 
the late 60’s began to explore the relationship between the media, 
governmental policies and foreign-policy decision-making. Two scholarly 
camps emerged, one arguing that the media have the potential to shape foreign 
policy and the subsequent decision-making. This is most commonly referred to 
                                                 
10
 This section draws upon research conducted by the author in an unpublished literature 
review at Dublin University College (Ottosen 2010) 
18 
as the “CNN-effect”, a term invented after the First Gulf War in 1991. Scholars 
such as Bernhard C. Cohen (1994), David Culbert (1998), Robert M. Entman 
(2000), Piers Robinson (2002) and Stuart N. Soroka (2003) have argued for 
such an effect. Many, and often contradictory, understandings of what the 
effect actually entails are found (Gilboa 2005 in Thune 2009:39). However, it 
can be argued that Steven Livingston provides a definition that encompasses 
many of the different aspects of the concept. He defines the CNN-effect as: (1) 
a policy agenda-setting agent, (2) an impediment to the achievement of desired 
policy goals and (3) an accelerant to policy decision-making (Livingston 
1997:3).  
Despite the vast research-material that supports the effect, the notion of 
media’s influence on governmental policies and decision-making has been 
highly contested. The opposing scholarly camp argues that the media have no 
such influence as held by the CNN-effect, but merely reflects and refers the 
attitudes expressed by governmental officials. In a theoretical perspective, this 
can be categorised as a part of the more wide-reaching “Propaganda-model” 
developed by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky in 1988 (Herman and 
Chomsky 2002). The model is based on five “filters” that control or influence 
the media: (1) size and ownership of the media corporation, (2) advertising, (3) 
reliance on government, elites and experts, (4) “flak” or disciplining reactions 
from the public, and (5) “anticommunism” as a national religion and control 
mechanism (Herman and Chomsky 2002:2). They emphasise that it is mainly 
the third and fourth filter that is applicable also outside the American context. 
Herman and Chomsky argue that when media cover its own nation, or its allies, 
it can be expected that certain perspectives will be accepted without criticism. 
These perspectives include the honesty of governmental leaders and their 
concern with peace and democracy (Herman and Chomsky 2002:34). 
Elements of Herman and Chomsky’s model, and especially the power of 
government and elites, have been supported by additional research conducted 
by other scholars, one seminal study being Lance Bennett’s from the 1980’s. 
Analysing the war in Nicaragua and the coverage in New York Times, he 
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tested the hypothesis that news is “indexed” in a manner that fits the 
governmental debate (Bennett 1990:103). Bennett found that news articles and 
editorials to a high degree reflected the opinions of governmental officials 
(Bennett 1990:116). In support of the notion of the media coverage as a 
reflection of governmental policies and expressed attitudes, is also Daniel 
Hallin’s seminal study The Media, the War in Vietnam and Political Support; A 
Critique of the Thesis of an Oppositional Media. His research concludes that 
the media did not, as many have claimed, cause a change in attitudes towards 
the war in Vietnam. The media only reflected the collapse of public and 
especially elite consensus (Hallin 1984:20). Studying the case of Somalia and 
the decision-making process leading up to the intervention in 1992, Steven 
Livingston and Todd Eachus provide further empirical results in support of 
Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda-model and Bennett’s theory of indexing. 
Livingston and Eachus conclude that “we find significant levels of news media 
attention following official decisions regarding U.S. policy toward Somalia” 
(1995:418).  
Despite the presence of several hard-line scholars in this debate, some 
researchers also point to a two-way causal relationship between the media 
coverage and governmental policies, one example being Yaeli Bloch and Sam 
Lehman-Wilzig (2002). Another intermediate position is taken by Henrik 
Thune (2009). Using Norway as a case, he found that in the eyes of leading 
scholars and journalist, the influence of the media on the field of foreign policy 
is “modest”. The political actors, however, perceive the media institutions to 
have an important political influence (Thune 2009:187). Thune argues that the 
reason for the discrepancy in perception is that while scholars and journalists 
“understands the potential effect in terms of a traditional causal concept of 
influence and power”, the policy makers understand media as a 
“communicative arena” where the media can define the “reality confronting 
foreign politicians” (Thune 2009:186-187).  
Having provided a brief introduction to the scholarly debate, it is not a 
bold statement to claim that numerous, and also conflicting, theories could 
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have been applied to this thesis. However, it can be argued that neither of these 
theories is suitable on their own, because they do not cover all the factors that 
will be scrutinised in the following sections; governmental and military 
sources, communication strategies, journalistic norms, and the characteristics 
of the news coverage. Rather, they are more general theories on the power of 
the media in the conduct of foreign policies.  The thesis will still draw upon the 
influential work by Lance Bennett and Herman and Chomsky, but is in need of 
a more specific theoretical model. 
 
3.2 The “onion” of media agenda-setting 
One such theory that does encompass most of the factors at hand is Maxwell 
McCombs’ (2004) theory of media agenda-setting, visualised by a model called 
“the metaphorical ‘onion’ of media agenda-setting” (model 3.1). The model is 
derived from the agenda-setting theory first presented by McCombs and 
Donald Shaw in 1968 (McCombs and Shaw 1972). McCombs’ model of media 
agenda-setting arguably serves as an intermediate position between the 
hardliners within the field. It recognises both the influence news sources can 
exert on the media agenda, but also how the journalists can filter the 
communication of the news sources. Finally, it recognises the importance of 
that media agenda, both for the source and for the public. Thus, the model fits 
with the approach of the study, and will henceforth be applied as the theoretical 
foundation of the thesis.  
One of the main focal points of the original theory of agenda-setting is 
how the agenda set by the media also sets the agenda for public opinion by 
highlighting certain issues (McCombs and Shaw 1972). McCombs and Shaw 
studied how the media covered political campaigns, and found that the main 
effect of the news media was to set an agenda through the presentation of a 
“media reality” or “media agenda”. In other terms, the media don’t tell people 
what to think, but what to think about (McCombs and Shaw 1972:176). 
Perception-analysis and media’s impact on public attitudes will not be studied 
in this thesis. But the importance of the media agenda argued by the theory 
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News sources 
shows the imperative role of the media, and moreover why the topic of this 
thesis hopefully will provide important knowledge for scholars, the Norwegian 
Armed Forces, journalists and the public. 
More important to the question at hand, scholars have used the agenda-
setting theory as a basis to take one step backwards in the process, studying the 
initial factors that shapes the media agenda (McCombs 2004:98). The results of 
this research have produced the theoretical model that will be employed here. 
To explain the factors that influence the media agenda, McCombs use the 
metaphor of “peeling an onion”, with the media agenda situated at the core 
(model 3.1) (McCombs 2004:100). The layers of the onion constitute different 
influential factors with their potential impact increasing the closer to the core 
they are situated. The outmost layer of the onion, namely the “news sources”, 
represents the key external news sources exemplified by the president, public 
relations activities and political campaigns. Deeper inside the onion we find the 
interactions and influence of “other news media”, a phenomenon referred to as 
“intermedia agenda-setting” (McCombs 2004:100). Finally, the “news norms” 
and traditions of the media constitute the layer immediately surrounding the 
core of the onion, namely the “media agenda”:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Model 3.1 McCombs’ “onion” of media agenda-setting 
News norms 
Other news media 
 
  MEDIA 
AGENDA 
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The “news sources” are at the outskirts of the onion. According to the 
model they have less impact on the media agenda than the news norms, but are 
still considered influential. Scholars have studied the relationship between the 
news sources and the media agenda. They have found that political campaigns 
do succeed in shaping the media agenda, but that the success depends on 
cultural differences, namely the norms and traditions of journalism (Hillsdale 
and Erlbaum 1991 quoted in McCombs 2004). Also, the public’s knowledge on 
government, business and stately issues, both internationally and locally, 
“originates with public information officers and other public relations 
practitioners who represent important news sources” (McCombs 2004:102). 
This is confirmed by findings that show how press releases and other 
information subsidies play a “key role” in the “daily construction of all media 
agendas” (McCombs 2004:103). In line with this notion is arguably one of 
Herman and Chomsky’s five filters, namely the “reliance of the media on 
information provided by government, business and ‘experts’ funded and 
approved by these primary sources and agents of power” (2002:2). As already 
argued, media visits and embedding constitute two examples of such 
information subsidies.  
The effects of powerful news sources, such as governmental elites, are 
further supported by Hallin (1984), Bennett (1990) and Livingston and Eachus 
(1995). Furthermore, professor in communication Dennis McQuail states that 
the media is a tool of the government, and that the government represents the 
central actor with influence on both the media and the public (McQuail 1994 
quoted in Gervin 2004:13). Looking at the most prominent sources in the 
coverage of “the war on terror”, Elisabeth Eide argues that the strong focus on 
conflict “excludes or marginalises peaceful strategies and the persons who 
support these strategies” (Eide 2004:267).  
The role of “other news media”, represented by the layer inside the news 
sources, will not be taken into account in this thesis. The reason is that the 
research questions address the relationship between the Norwegian Armed 
Forces and the media, not the intermedia agenda-setting as this factor refers to. 
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Moreover, in the setting of media visits and embedding, the journalists will 
very seldom quote each other and draw upon other journalist’s work. When 
newspapers or TV-stations prioritise to send a journalist to Afghanistan, they 
seek to find and present their own stories. In addition, McCombs explains that 
with regards to intermedia agenda-setting, it is the elite media that influence the 
agenda of other news media (McCombs 2004:113). In the setting of 
Afghanistan, it is almost exclusively elite media that visit the Norwegian 
troops. This is also confirmed by Petter Lindqvist in the interview conducted 
with him. When local newspapers on occasion do travel to Afghanistan, it is 
mostly to cover stories relevant to their local community at home. Thus, the 
elite media will not usually influence other media in that setting. 
 The layer closest to the core, the “news norms”, according to the theory, 
has the strongest influence on the media agenda, and “define the ground rules 
for the ultimate shaping of the media agenda” (McCombs 2004:99). The news 
norms, as explained by McCombs, serve as “very powerful filters between the 
news sources and the media agenda, and guide the journalists’ selection and 
interpretation of the information given” (McCombs 2004:117). There is 
“substantial evidence” supporting the argument that such norms can shape the 
media agenda (McCombs 2004:107), but the norms also are subject to “cultural 
differences” which affects the strength of the filter (McCombs 2004:105). 
McCombs use news norms as a term to describe both the newsworthiness 
ascribed to an issue by the journalists, and the more general “intervening 
influence” the media exert on the media agenda communicated. 
According to the model, the news sources and the journalistic norms 
will contribute to shape the “media agenda”, which is situated at the core of the 
onion. The media agenda can be described as the set of issues addressed by the 
newspapers, television and radio.  
 
3.2.1 News sources: The Norwegian Armed Forces 
The Norwegian Armed Forces will represent the layer of news sources, and 
their communication strategy for Afghanistan in 2011 (Norwegian Armed 
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Forces 2011) will serve as a comparative element when analysing the media 
agenda. Because the goals of the strategy constitute the most accurate measure 
of what the Norwegian Armed Forces as a news source seeks to communicate 
to the public at home and abroad, it will be useful to incorporate the strategy in 
the theoretical “onion” developed by McCombs. A potential critique of 
employing this strategy is that it does not necessarily include the “hidden” 
objectives that the Norwegian Armed Forces might want to keep out of their 
stated strategy. However, the strategy itself is not actively communicated to the 
public by the Norwegian Armed Forces, indicating that it is not intended to 
serve as propaganda. The Norwegian Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs 
will also represent the news source when media visits are arranged in relation 
to their visits to the Norwegian military bases in Afghanistan. 
According to James E. Grunig (1976 quoted in Schiager 2011) there are 
two types of communication strategies: the symmetrical and asymmetrical. In a 
symmetrical strategy, both the source and the recipient benefit equally from the 
relationship. In an asymmetrical strategy however, the source benefits on the 
effect on expense of the recipient, seeking to influence behaviour (Grunig 1976 
quoted in Schiager 2011:15). In his research on how the relationship between 
journalists and the Norwegian Armed Forces colour the general presentation of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces in the media, Espen Schiager found that the 
Norwegian Armed Forces employ a two way asymmetric model. This means 
that the communication goes both ways, but that the only party benefiting from 
the communication is the Norwegian Armed Forces (Ihlen and Robstad 
2004:58-59). As we recall, Borchgrevink also found that the Norwegian Armed 
Forces only communicate information that portrays them in a positive light 
(Borchgrevink 2010:127). Schiager argues that the Norwegian Armed Forces 
communicate to seek influence. They use the media to gain public support, and 
they need public support to increase the funds from the government and 
increase recruitment from the population.  (Schiager 2011:92-93). 
The Norwegian Armed Forces’ communication strategy derives from two 
paramount levels: NATO’s communication strategy and the political goals of 
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Norway’s involvement in Afghanistan. In the document it is stated that 
communication and contact with the media in certain contexts constitute a 
“critical factor of success”, and meeting the goals of the strategy will enable 
the Norwegian Armed Forces to obtain the “greatest support possible for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces” (Norwegian Armed Forces 2011).  Thus, the 
strategy will constitute the core of the analysis in this thesis. The following 
three general goals of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ communication strategy 
are listed in the document: 
 
Achieve the greatest support possible for the Norwegian Armed Forces 
in the Norwegian public through as open, timely and honest information 
about the mission, organizing and effort of the Norwegian Armed Forces 
in Afghanistan, and their cooperation with other actors in the theatre, as 
possible. 
 
Create understanding for Norway’s role in NATO through 
communicating how the NATO-cooperation is closely linked to the 
ISAF-effort. 
 
Substantiate NATO/ISAF communication. 
                   
                  (Norwegian Armed Forces 2011) 
 
These are the paramount goals of the strategy. However, in order to analyse to 
what extent the media coverage fulfils the strategy, one needs to look at the 
more specific objectives listed. The thesis will draw upon four such specific 
goals. 
First, the cooperation and mentoring of Afghan security forces is a topic 
referred to numerous times in the document. The strategy stresses that 
mentoring is one of the goals of the ISAF-mission, and thus “the 
communication-effort must place equal emphasis on the cooperation with 
Afghan security forces” (Norwegian Armed Forces 2011). This issue is a result 
of a decision made by NATO Heads of State and Government in 2009 to 
“oversee higher-level training for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 
training and mentoring for the Afghan National Police (ANP)” (ISAF 2010). 
26 
The ANA and ANP is categorised under the umbrella of Afghanistan’s 
National Security Forces (ANSAF). The issue of mentoring was also 
emphasized by Grete Faremo, the Norwegian Minister of Defence, in her 
speech to Oslo Militære Samfund in January 2011: “The goal is that the in the 
spring of 2011, the Afghans will take on the responsibility of the first 
provinces” (Faremo January 2011).  Moreover, two out of NATO’s three 
strategic communication goals address the partnership with Afghan forces, and 
the transition of leadership to them (Norwegian Armed Forces 2011). Based on 
this it can be argued that a primary and specific goal of the communication 
strategy is to “Communicate the cooperation and mentoring of Afghan security 
forces”. 
 Second, the strategy emphasises the importance of international 
cooperation as the foundation of the ISAF-mission. In the general goals already 
referred to, it is encouraged to “Create understanding for Norway’s role in 
NATO through communicating how the NATO-cooperation is closely linked to 
the ISAF-effort.” Moreover, it is specifically stated that “the communication 
shall attribute more emphasis on the international cooperation, which is a 
precondition for the entire ISAF-mission” (Norwegian Armed Forces 2011). 
Thus, a second central specific goal of the strategy is to: “Communicate the 
importance of a broad international effort”. 
 Third, the strategy on numerous occasions discusses the object of 
creating an understanding of what the Norwegian Armed Forces’ military 
mission entails and precisely what they do in Afghanistan. Through open and 
truthful communication about “the mission, organisation, and effort of 
Norwegian forces in Afghanistan”, they seek to obtain “the greatest support 
possible” in the Norwegian population. Moreover, in the interview conducted 
with the chief of communication at the Norwegian Joint Headquarters, Petter 
Lindqvist, he describes the tasks and competence of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces as key objectives in the communication. This further underscores the 
important role of this goal in the communication strategy of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces in Afghanistan 2011. Thus, the third specific goal derived from 
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the communication strategy is: “Promote and explain the Norwegian Armed 
Forces’ tasks and competence”. 
Fourth, the document states that too much information about combat 
actions will give an “incorrect and fragmented image” of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces’ effort, and can ultimately “counteract the goals of the ISAF-
operation”. The use of such a strong word as “counteract” indicate the potential 
risk a strong focus on combat actions represents to the Norwegian Armed 
Forces and ISAF. Thus, it can be argued that a fourth specific goal of the 
communication strategy is to “Downplay combat actions”. 
 
To summarise: Based on the Norwegian Armed Forces’ communication 
strategy for Afghanistan 2011, the following four specific communication-
goals have been identified as vital for the organisation, and will consequently 
be employed in the empirical analysis:  
 
1. Communicate the cooperation and mentoring of Afghan security forces. 
2. Communicate the importance of a broad international effort. 
3. Promote and explain the Norwegian Armed Forces’ tasks and competence. 
4. Downplay combat actions. 
 
These four specific goals will be operationalised into variables that will be 
employed in order to analyse the content of the news coverage. Moreover, the 
strategy emphasises both media visits and embedding as means to fulfil the 
communication goals. This confirms the importance of these tools in the 
execution of the strategy.  
In order to test the relevance of the goals derived from the 
communication strategy, the four goals presented above were discussed with a 
number of key informants. Petter Lindqvist, Chief of communication at the 
Norwegian Joint Headquarters of the Norwegian Armed Forces, confirms that 
the four goals is a precise interpretation of the strategy, and that a content 
analysis in light of these four communication goals can provide an indication 
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of to what extent the strategy is fulfilled by the coverage. Aftenposten’s 
correspondent in Afghanistan, Kristin Solberg describes the four goals as 
“fairly accurate” according to her experience. Moreover, Dagbladet’s reporter 
Einar Hagvaag, who has travelled independently in Afghanistan on several 
occasions, but who also stayed in the Norwegian camps after the four soldiers 
were killed, confirms that these are the communication goals the Norwegian 
Armed Forces work towards: “This is what they emphasise when you talk to 
them. This is what they are interested in communicating.” 
 
3.2.2 News norms: “Vær varsom-plakaten” 
According to McCombs’ model, an important aspect to take into account when 
studying media-state relations is the news norms and traditions of journalism. 
In the context of this thesis, the ethical norms of Norwegian journalism are 
arguably the most relevant factor to consider. Thus, McCombs’ “news norms” 
will here be understood as the ethical norms of journalism. Such ethical norms 
are also emphasised by McCombs as influential to the media agenda 
(McCombs 2004:112). The ethical norms of Norwegian journalism are largely 
founded on “Vær Varsom-plakaten”, or the “Code of Ethics” (Norsk 
Presseforbund 2005)
11
, and can implicitly affect the issues covered by the 
media through its encouragement of communicating “different views” and 
“critical perspectives” (Norsk Presseforbund 2005). The norms can also help 
the journalists to act as objective as possible, and to exclude information that 
solely serves the interests of their sources. Thus, the ethical norms of 
journalism can potentially counteract the Norwegian Armed Forces’ effort to 
communicate the goals of their communication strategy. 
“Vær varsom-plakaten” is a set of journalistic ethical norms which 
Norwegian media strive to obey and respect. The “rules” have been developed 
by the Norwegian Press Association, and are based on three paramount issues: 
the journalistic product, the journalist’s relationship with its sources and the 
                                                 
11
 The “Program” of Norsk Journalistlag could also have constituted a useful ethical 
framework of Norwegian journalism, but contains several chapters not relevant to this thesis, 
and also overlaps with “Vær varsom-plakaten” on several issues.  
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journalist’s professional integrity (Ottosen, Røssland og Østbye 2002:115).  
The first version of “Vær Varsom-plakaten” was published in 1936, and has 
been revised several times. The thesis will draw upon four of the “rules” listed 
in “Vær varsom-plakaten” found most relevant to the study at hand: 
 
1.2 The press maintains important tasks such as information, debate and 
a critical perspective on society. The press has a particular responsibility 
to ensure that different views are communicated. 
 
1.3 The press should protect the freedom of speech, the freedom of press 
and the principal of non-disclosed information 
[“offentlighetsprinsippet”]. The press can’t give in to pressure from 
anyone who seeks to hinder an open debate, free flow of information or 
free access to sources.  
 
2.2 Each newsroom and every reporter must protect their integrity and 
credibility to be able to act free and independent in relation with 
individuals or groups who, for ideological, financial or other reasons, 
seek to influence the editorial content. 
 
3.2 Be critical in the selection of sources, and make sure that the 
information given is correct. It is considered good journalistic ethic to 
strive to achieve a broad and relevant selection of sources. 
 
    (Norsk Presseforbund 2005) 
 
An important aspect of “Vær Varsom-plakaten” is the relationship between the 
journalists and their sources. Sigurd Allern (1997) addresses this issue, 
organising the sources in three categories: “organisations of professional 
sources”, “other organisations of sources” and “personal sources”. Allern 
emphasises the powerful role of “organisations of professional sources”. Such 
organisations have a specialised staff in charge of public relations, often with 
experience from journalism and with many contacts within both politics and 
media (Allern 1997:10).  
 One example of “organisations of professional sources” is the 
Norwegian Armed Forces. Allern (2001) argues that the Norwegian Armed 
Forces have the largest public relations-department in Norway, and Anders 
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Sømme Hammer states that “the Norwegian Armed Forces have a huge 
information organisation, and use it to meet their goals”. The influence and 
power of the PR-organisation of the Norwegian Armed Forces is supported by 
the results from Respons Analyse’s survey with 500 journalists (2011). 62 per 
cent of the journalists answered that if Norwegian soldiers have been involved 
in an accident, they get their information through the communication 
department of Norwegian Armed Forces.  
Within “organisations of professional sources”, we also find what Mark 
Fishman labels “authorised knowers” (Fishman 1980 quoted in Allern 
1997:41). Journalists use these persons extensively as sources due to the 
authority attributed to their position, and because they provide accessible and 
understandable information. With regards to the Norwegian Armed Forces and 
the individual soldier as an authorised knower, their position becomes even 
stronger because the knowledge on military issues is limited in most 
newsrooms (Allern 1997:208; Diesen quoted in Journalisten January 15. 2010). 
Moreover, as a result of the decrease in personnel employed in the Norwegian 
Armed Forces by mandatory service, the general knowledge on the Norwegian 
Armed Forces in the Norwegian population has decreased, thus increasing the 
credibility of the authorised knowers (Schiager 2011:14). This gives the key 
sources in the military organisation “increased power to influence the content 
and framing of the coverage” (Allern 1997:208).  Allern argues that accepting 
information on the terms of the military organisation undermines the trust the 
audience have in the journalists’ loyalty to them (1997:218).  
 
3.2.3 Media agenda: Indexing, framing and other characteristics 
The inner core of McCombs’ “onion” is the media agenda, which represents 
the messages communicated to the audience through media’s coverage. Thus, it 
will be measured, among other variables, to what extent the four 
communication goals of the Norwegian Armed Forces are fulfilled by the 
media agenda. When analysing the media agenda, Bennett’s theory of indexing 
will also be applied. Indexing is a way of practicing journalism, and will help 
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us to understand how and why the journalists produce the media agenda 
presented in the coverage. Furthermore, to incorporate that theory in 
McCombs’ onion will further strengthen the applicability of the model to the 
research question at hand. Originally, Bennett dealt largely with governmental 
officials when discussing the concept, but he also states that the information is 
heavily structured by other elite cues and official information (Bennett 
1994:26-28). In a more general setting, the concept of indexing implies that 
“News generally reflects the story lines of those with the a) greatest power to 
affect the situation or issue, b) the greatest institutional capacity to engage 
government news “flywheels” or c) the best communications operations” 
(Bennett et. al. 2008:63). As briefly described earlier, Bennett has found that 
“patterns of foreign policy news (diversity of sources, range of viewpoints and 
policy options) can be explained by the tendency to ‘index’ news coverage” 
(Bennett 1994:25). Indexing can also be described as a “weighting system for 
what gets into the news, what prominence it receives, how long it gets covered, 
and who gets the voice on the stories” (Bennett et. al. 2007:49 quoted in 
McQuail 2010:243). The ability of the sources to influence who gets 
interviewed and what stories are reported, results in what Bennett labels 
“officialised news” (Bennett 1994:23). Applied to the context of media visits 
and embedding in Afghanistan, the theory arguably suggests that it is the 
official sources on the military bases that will determine who gets interviewed 
and what topics are being covered in the media agenda. Moreover, Bennett 
argues that the same sources are also “active players in the press management 
game, applying various techniques of strategic communications” (Bennett 
1994:29). 
The notion of indexing is in line with the influence McCombs’ attributes 
to the news sources. However, Bennett arguably differs from McCombs’ on 
one aspect. Bennett does not attribute the same ability as McCombs to the 
ethical norms of journalism in counteracting the news source. Bennett does 
acknowledge that journalists are concerned with including different 
perspectives, but only when there is a debate within the official circles (Bennett 
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1994:24). Moreover, he argues that press may be seen as “abdicating its 
traditional mandate to raise an independent ‘voice of the people’ under 
appropriate circumstances” (1990:106). As a consequence, Bennett has been 
criticised by Scott L. Althaus et. al. (1996) for downplaying the role of 
journalistic norms. Studying the U.S.-Libya crisis of 1985-86, they found that 
reporters who follow journalistic norms may create a “more diverse and 
oppositional discourse” and that the media may “in some circumstances exert a 
greater degree of control over their texts than predicted by the indexing 
hypothesis” (1996:418). Thus, and for the purpose of this study, it will be 
important to see if the ethical norms of Norwegian journalism are salient in the 
coverage produced in Afghanistan, and what potential impact it may have. In 
addition, Bennett’s theory will also be employed when discussing the 
theoretical implications of the findings. 
When explaining the effects of indexing, Bennett presents an example 
from the political process leading up to the first Gulf War: “By accepting the 
frames offered by Bush, the press helped to limit debate […]” (Dorman 1991 
quoted in Bennett 1994:26). This brings us to the concept of “framing” the 
media agenda.  
Within media research, framing has been defined in different ways, and 
has also been employed in different contexts (McCombs 2004:89).  In terms of 
agenda-setting, Robert Entman provides a useful definition of framing:  
 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation 
and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.  
 
(Entman 1993 quoted in McCombs 2004:87)  
 
For practicing journalists, framing relates to what he or she chooses to focus on 
when telling a story. Most important is how the title, introduction and first 
section of the text are framed. Newspaper stories employ a “relevance 
structure” where the most important and interesting features of the story comes 
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first, thus the story communicates the “macrostructure” in its title and first 
sentences (Van Dijk 1985:122-123). A frame has the power to structure our 
thoughts and influence how we think about a political issue or other objects in 
the news. With regards to the media agenda, a frame can be understood as the 
“central organizing idea” that provides the audience with a context and 
meaning through “selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” (Tankard et. 
al. quoted in McCombs 2004:87). Bennett argues that “the growing 
sophistication of press management techniques holds the constant possibility 
that some officials will be more successful engineering favourable media 
framings for their positions than others” (Bennett 1994:29). 
Thus, when investigating the characteristics of the media coverage from 
Afghanistan, framing will be an important characteristic to include in the 
empirical analysis. For this thesis, it will be most relevant to investigate the 
tone of the frames, namely if they are positive or critical. First of all, this will 
allow for an analysis of in which light the Norwegian mission in Afghanistan, 
and their communication goals, are presented to the public. Secondly, it will 
allow for an analysis of to what extent the journalistic ethical norm of “critical 
perspectives” is met by the coverage.  
Together, the concepts of indexing and framing will hopefully help to 
increase our understanding of the nature and characteristics of the coverage, 
and provide insight into the media-state relation. Having explained the 
theoretical framework of this thesis, an adapted version of McCombs’ “onion” 
of media agenda-setting can be presented: 
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News sources:  
Norwegian Armed Forces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 3.2 Adapted version of McCombs’ “onion” of media agenda-setting. 
 
 
3.3 Hypotheses 
On the basis of the theoretical framework presented above, the research 
questions will be operationalised into three hypotheses. The hypotheses 
constitute an important tool in providing answers to those questions.  
 
First, McCombs states that the role of news norms differs from culture to 
culture. In the context of this thesis, media visits and embedding arguably 
constitute a distinct culture of journalism due to the exceptional circumstances 
with regards to restrictions, location and method of reporting.  Furthermore, 
Bennett’s theory of indexing argues that the media agenda will index the 
opinions of the official sources present. Thus, when studying the characteristics 
of the coverage produced by journalists visiting the Norwegian Armed Forces 
in Afghanistan, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
 
 
 
 
News norms:  
“Vær Varsom-plakaten” 
Media agenda:  
Characteristics of 
coverage 
35 
Hypothesis #1 
In the artificial “culture” of media visits and embedding, the characteristics of 
the media coverage will show that Norwegian journalists leave behind central 
ethical norms of journalism such as the number and diversity of sources, 
critical perspectives and free flow of information. 
 
Second, McCombs’ theory suggests that when the news norms are not present, 
the news sources will be able to shape the media agenda. However, Bennett 
argues that the success of the sources’ communication depends on the 
“sophistication of press management techniques” (Bennett 1994:29). Thus, the 
following hypothesis can be presented:  
 
Hypothesis #2 
When the journalists in large depend on official information, issues such as 
tasks, competence, and the role of the international effort are fulfilled by the 
coverage. However, the Norwegian Armed Forces fail to downplay combat 
action and fail to communicate the more specific goal of mentoring the Afghan 
forces.  
 
Third, according to hypotheses 1 and 2, one could expect that the empirical 
findings are not in complete congruence with both McCombs’ theory of media 
agenda-setting and Bennett’s theory of indexing. Thus, a final hypothesis can 
be formulated:  
 
Hypothesis #3 
The empirical findings are expected to show that the media reflect the opinions 
of the sources only to a certain extent. Hence, it is necessary to open for a 
discussion of the established theories of media-state relations, and the extent to 
which they cover all relevant factors.  
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4.0 Methodology 
 
The research questions presented in this thesis yield certain analytical 
challenges because they address both the characteristics of the media agenda 
communicated, as well as the factors with the potential to influence that 
agenda. This constitutes two different analytical levels, the second requiring an 
analysis of more hidden mechanisms. Thus, in order to test the hypotheses and 
provide answers to the research questions, method triangulation will be applied 
in order to ensure the methodological robustness of the thesis. Method 
triangulation can be defined as the use of “more than one method or source of 
data […]” in a study (Bryman 2008:379). Eugene J. Webb et. al. argue that the 
most persuasive evidence “comes through a triangulation of measurement 
processes” (1966:3).  
The core of the methodological approach is the quantitative content 
analysis. In addition, two supplementing methods have been included, namely 
a qualitative content analysis and semi-structured interviews. The three 
empirical studies will hopefully provide an extensive collection of data that 
will enable well-founded answers to the research questions. 
 
4.1 Quantitative content analysis 
In order to investigate the newspaper articles produced by Norwegian 
journalists in Afghanistan, a quantitative content analysis will be conducted. 
Quantitative content analysis can be defined as “a research technique for the 
objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication” (Berelson quoted in Hansen et. al. 1998:94). This is often 
considered to be a necessary tool when studying mass communications (Riffe, 
Lacy and Fico 2005:39), and will thus be highly important when seeking to 
answer the research questions at hand. 
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4.1.1 Sample 
A sample can be defined as a “subset of units from the entire population being 
studied” (Riffe et. al. 2005:95). When conducting a quantitative content 
analysis, one must choose the units carefully, and consider the level of analysis 
most suitable to the research questions. This can either be a volume of a 
newspaper, a single newspaper, an article or a word (Østbye et. al. 2002:219). 
Because this thesis seeks to analyse the news coverage and to what extent the 
coverage produced in Afghanistan fulfils the goals of the communication 
strategy, it is most relevant to look at the individual articles. Moreover, this is 
the level most commonly employed in quantitative content analysis (Østbye et. 
al. 2002:221). The sample does not include editorials since journalists who 
travel to Afghanistan rarely write them. It can be argued that the editorials 
represent the official view of the newspaper, and could thus potentially affect 
the attitudes of the reporters. However, due to the fact that they are produced in 
the different news rooms in Norway, and not in Afghanistan, they are not 
suited to be a part of the sample.  
With regards to sampling dates, the population of units consists of 
articles produced in the period from June 29. 2010 to June 30. 2011. This 
period has been chosen for several reasons. First, the most recent 
communication strategy of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ in Afghanistan 
applies to 2011. In order to maximize the relevance of this thesis, it is that 
version that has been applied. Second, due to the fact that the research for this 
thesis started in July 2011, the latter half of 2011 could not be included in the 
sample. However, according to Petter Lindqvist and the Norwegian Armed 
Forces, the communication strategy is also relevant and applicable to the last 
six months of 2010. Thus, the original period was set from July 1. 2010 to June 
30. 2011. When studying the material, it was discovered that Norwegian 
journalists had arrived at the Norwegian camp in Mazar-e-Sharif on June 29. 
2010, due to the four Norwegian soldiers killed on June 27. 2010. As a 
consequence, the sample was initiated two days earlier. 
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In order to identify the individual articles, the text-database Retriever is 
employed. All national and regional newspapers in Norway are included, both 
paper and online editions. The smaller, locally based newspapers, however, are 
not included. As explained in chapter 3.2, they seldom have the resources to 
send their journalists to Afghanistan. Moreover, the sample does not include 
TV-broadcasts, because a content analysis of TV-broadcasts requires a 
different approach than an analysis of articles. They have a different structure, 
images play a far more important role, and thus it will be problematic to 
include them in the same sample as the articles in the quantitative analysis.  
Using Retriever, I searched for hits on the word “Afghanistan” within 
the category of “norske aviser” and “web”. The search resulted in 48.092 hits. 
Through a thorough screening of those hits, all of the articles produced by 
journalists either on media visits or while embedded were identified. This 
resulted in 74 articles. The Norwegian Armed Forces also provided a list of 
journalists that had visited the bases in the period referred to above. To ensure 
that no articles were left out, the 74 articles were compared to that list. As a 
result of this thorough and broad approach, the sample of units constitutes the 
entire population of articles produced by Norwegian journalists in Afghanistan, 
either on media visits or through embedding, in the last six months of 2010 and 
the first six months of 2011.
12
 Only 1 out of the 74 articles was written by an 
embedded journalist.
 
This means that the vast majority of articles were 
produced by journalists on media visits.  
 
4.1.2 Variables13 
The units under investigation have been analysed through two groups of 
variables: “General characteristics of the coverage” and “The fulfilment of the 
communication strategy”. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 A control group will not be included because the thesis does not set out to infer causality. 
13
 For a more thorough description the variables, see the coding manual in appendix D. 
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A. General Characteristics of the coverage 
The first group consists of six variables addressing the general characteristics 
of the articles.
14  
 Hopefully, the results of these six variables will help to 
increase our understanding of the nature of the coverage, and allow for a 
profound answer to the first research question.
 15
 Moreover, these variables are 
important in order to discuss the role of journalistic norms, and the larger issue 
of the media-state relation.
 
 
 
1. Type of sources  
This variable provides useful information regarding which type of sources are 
given access to the newspapers’ columns when the journalists visit the 
Norwegian military in Afghanistan. This is particularly interesting with regards 
to McCombs’ theoretical model, the concept of indexing, and the potential 
influence news sources have on the media agenda. The values of this variable 
include 1) military or the police, 2) politicians, 3) humanitarian representatives, 
4) scholars, 5) civilians, or 6) the Taliban or war-lords.  
 
2. Number of sources  
In order to provide an indication of the thoroughness, time and resources 
devoted to the articles, it is measured how many sources the journalists have 
interviewed. As stated in “Vær varsom plakaten”, it is a journalistic ideal to 
include as many sources as possible. The number of sources thus says 
something about the journalistic quality of the article (Nordby 2009:33).  
 
3. Framing  
As explained in chapter 3.2.3, an important concept within content analysis of 
news items is “framing”. For this thesis, the most relevant has been to 
                                                 
14
 Whether or not the article is referred to on the front page will not be coded. Because an 
online article always is referred to on the front, this will not be relevant to measure. 
15
 The first two variables have been extracted from an analysis of the general Afghanistan 
coverage from 2001-2008, conducted by Kristin Jonassen Nordby (2009). Nordby’s sample 
includes 399 articles from Aftenposten and Dagsavisen written on the war in Afghanistan, 
regardless of where the journalists were reporting from. This comparative perspective will 
allow for a more elaborate discussion of the data 
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investigate the tone of the frames employed. The values range from 1) positive, 
2) neutral to 3) critical. When measuring these values, it will also contribute to 
our understanding of in which light the communication goals of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces are presented.  
 
4. Genre  
This is a descriptive variable employed mostly to achieve an understanding of 
what kind of articles are being produced in Afghanistan, and how the 
journalists choose to present their stories. The values for this variable are 1) 
news article, 2) interview, 3) reportage, 4) feature, 5) comment/background and 
6) other.
16
 
 
5. Topic of article  
The thesis also analyse the key topic presented in the articles. This allows for a 
discussion on what specific issues the article addresses. The variable includes 
the following values: 1) effects of the Norwegian effort, 2) combat actions, 3) 
casualties, 4) the everyday-life of the soldiers, 5) equipment and personnel, 6) 
security-situation and 7) other.
17
 It is worth mentioning that the value “combat 
actions” overlaps with one of the variables derived from the communication 
strategy. However, this is a necessary value for this variable, because it 
constitutes an important topic when analysing the characteristics of war 
coverage.  
 
6. Month 
Due to the expected impact the four Norwegian casualties had on the coverage 
conducted by journalists visiting the Norwegian military in Afghanistan, it has 
been important to find out how many of the articles were produced as a direct 
consequence of the four casualties. This helps increase our understanding of 
how much explanatory power should be attributed to that tragic event when 
discussing the empirical data. 
                                                 
16
 See coding manual (appendix D) for explanations and definitions of the different genres. 
17
 Though “other” is a value with a relatively low frequency in the articles, it would have 
been beneficial for the analysis to extract “humanitarian situation” as a separate topic to 
visualise its absence from the coverage. 
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B. The fulfilment of the communication strategy 
The second group of variables refers to the four goals deducted from the 
Norwegian Armed Forces’ communication strategy. These have been 
employed in order to measure to what extent the media agenda reflects the 
strategy, and are highly important in order to answer the second research 
question. The variables reflecting the communication strategy are the following 
four:  
 
1. Mentoring 
One of the goals in the communication strategy is to communicate the 
cooperation and mentoring of Afghan security forces. In order to provide an 
indication of how salient mentoring is in the articles written from Afghanistan, 
the content has been measured on this variable, with values ranging from “no”, 
“mentioned” to “main focus” depending on the salience of the issue throughout 
the article. 
 
2. International effort 
The communication strategy also stresses that the Norwegian mission is a part 
of a larger international effort. This variable indicates whether the articles 
address Norway’s membership in NATO as a precondition for the mission in 
Afghanistan, describe the conflict as a NATO/ISAF-mission or describe the 
cooperation with other NATO/ISAF-countries in Afghanistan. The values 
“no”, “mentioned” and “main focus” indicate the salience of the international 
effort throughout the article. 
 
3. Tasks and competence 
The Norwegian Armed Forces are also concerned with communicating the 
tasks and competence of the soldiers. When coding this variable, it is analysed 
whether the articles describe the specific tasks of a soldier, what they have 
been trained to do or the competence inherent in the Norwegian troops. The 
values of the variable range from “no”, “mentioned” to “main focus” 
42 
depending on the salience of the tasks and competence of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces throughout the article. 
 
4. Combat 
According to the communication strategy, it is regarded as problematic by the 
Norwegian Armed Forces if combat action receives much focus in the articles. 
Thus, this has been yet another important variable to measure. Depending on 
the salience of combat throughout the article, the values range from “no”, 
“mentioned” and “main focus”. Road bombs constitute combat action in this 
context. 
 
4.2 Supplementing the quantitative analysis. 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the quantitative content 
analysis is the central methodological approach of the thesis. However, it is 
arguably not a sufficient tool, because it is too structural and superficial and 
does not allow for the nuances necessary to achieve the deep understanding this 
study aims at providing. Thus, in order to sophisticate the thesis and provide a 
more in-depth analysis of the coverage produced in Afghanistan, a qualitative 
content analysis will be conducted. Also, semi-structured interviews with six 
key informants are carried out in order to give further insight into how 
journalists cover the war, and to help improve our understanding of the 
mechanisms of the relationship between the media and the state. 
 
4.2.1 Qualitative content analysis 
The qualitative content analysis constitutes an important supplement to the 
quantitative analysis due to its ability to analyse the deeper structures of the 
content. This is also why Ole Holsti recommends that the two methods should 
be combined in order to “supplement each other” (Holsti quoted in Riffe et. al. 
2005:36).  
The chosen case is the NRK-documentary “Norge i krig – Oppdrag 
Afghanistan”. The documentary was produced by embedded journalists and 
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broadcasted on NRK in April and May 2011. Thus, the analysis will hopefully 
also increase our understanding of embedding, and the messages 
communicated through that method of reporting. The documentary, presented 
over six episodes and lasting more than 3 hours in total, is a pioneering 
depiction of the Norwegian mission that provides a unique and influential close 
up portrayal of the Norwegian mission in Afghanistan. Due to its relevance, the 
six episodes of the documentary constitute the units for the qualitative content 
analysis. The focus of this analysis is mainly centred on the variables derived 
from the communication strategy, and how the documentary is framed. The 
documentary also provides important insight into the mechanisms operating 
when journalists live with the soldiers and join them in combat.  
A qualitative content analysis differs from the quantitative in that it 
searches for “the underlying themes in the material being analysed” (Bryman 
2008:529), and seeks to interpret and not count the content. Compared to the 
quantitative content analysis, the qualitative approach does not have a highly 
structured research approach (Østbye et. al. 2002:67). However, there are some 
guidelines that facilitate the analysis. One of these is to determine what kind of 
discourse the text represents. Discourse in this context refers to how the text 
organises its message. One way to categorise a text is to determine which of the 
following three discourses it applies: a descriptive discourse, a story, or an 
argumentative discourse (Østbye et. al. 2002:71). A descriptive text emphasises 
the physical connections between the elements addressed in the text. A story 
goes further, emphasising connections between the elements in terms of time 
and causality. It also highlights “human interest”, and often centres on a 
subject. This discourse is much employed in factual texts such as news and 
documentaries. Lastly, the argumentative discourse seeks to convince the 
audience about an issue. Editorials, political speeches and commercials are 
typical examples of the argumentative discourse.  
With regards to the documentary “Norge i krig”, it arguably employs a 
“story”-discourse. This will be further elaborated in the analysis, but is 
necessary to state here in order to present the methodological approach. When 
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analysing the topic in a “story”, the model developed by Algirdas Julien 
Greimas, known as the actantial model, is often employed (Østbye et. al. 
2002:76) (model 4.1). Greimas starts off with the assumption that the story has 
a subject that seeks to obtain something. This “something” is categorised as an 
object, and can either be a thing, a person or a value. The project cannot be 
completed without conflict. The subject faces resistance from its enemies, but 
also receives assistance from its helpers. The structures of the story can be 
translated into a model consisting of three axis and six actants: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 4.1 Greimas’ actantial model (Greimas in Østbye et. al.  2002:76). 
 
Through replacing the different actants in the model with the actants in the 
documentary, it will be easier to identify what messages the documentary 
communicates, whether the four specific goals of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces’ communication strategy are fulfilled, and how those issues are framed. 
 
4.2.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews constitute yet another valuable addition to the 
methodological approach of this study, because they substantiate the analysis, 
provide nuanced perspectives to the results and deepen our understanding of 
how the journalists work when they report from an armed conflict.  
Semi-structured interviews are useful as a method because they provide 
the researcher with an interview guide (see appendix A and B), making it easier 
to compare the answers, but at the same time allowing the researcher to pose 
additional questions where relevant (Bryman 2008:438). It also allows the 
Communication-axis: 
 
Project-axis: 
 
Conflict-axis: 
 
Object Sender Recipient 
Helper Subject 
 
Enemy 
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researcher to start of with the easier questions, providing the interviewee with a 
“comfort level”, before more critical questions can be asked. (Rubin and Rubin 
2005:117). Such interviews are, together with unstructured interviews, often 
categorised as qualitative interviews.  
The interviews conducted in this thesis (in which some of the results 
have already been referred to) can be categorized as topical interviews which 
“explore what, when, how, why, or with what consequence something 
happened” (Rubin and Rubin 2005:11). Due to the time and space available, 
the interviews have been limited to six key informants. A key informant is a 
knowledgeable source with relevant first-hand experience and insight into the 
research problem (Rubin and Rubin 2005:65). 
I have chosen one journalist from each of the newspapers with the 
highest frequency of articles analysed in this thesis: Rune Thomas Ege (VG), 
Einar Hagvaag (Dagbladet) and Kristin Solberg (Aftenposten). In addition, 
Marius Arnesen (NRK) and the independent journalist Anders Sømme 
Hammer are included in the sample. The three interviews with the Norwegian 
Armed Forces’ chief of communication, Petter Lindqvist, complement our 
understanding of the communication strategy and the methods of 
communication employed.
18
  
 
4.3 Maintaining reliability and validity 
 
4.3.1 Reliability 
Riffe et al. argue that quantitative content analysis is a reliable method, because 
it employs explicitly defined and accepted concept definitions that “control 
assignment of content to particular categories” (2005:123). The method is also 
unobtrusive, thus not risking any reactive effect (Bryman 2008:288-289). Yet, 
a common critique of the content analysis is that it can never be truly objective 
because it depends on the perception and impressions of the individual coder. 
This can threaten the inter-coder reliability of the research, being defined as 
                                                 
18
 See appendix C for a more thorough description of the interviews and the key informants.  
46 
“the degree to which two or more individuals agree about the coding of an 
item” (Bryman 2008:694). As a result, many have omitted the word “objective” 
from the definition of the quantitative content analysis (Hansen et. al. 1998:95). 
However, this threat can be reduced when operating with a thorough and 
precise coding manual and schedule, as provided in this thesis. A coding 
schedule is where the researcher enters the data from the analysis. For the 
quantitative analysis, the database SPSS has been used to register the result. 
Moreover, the coding manual (see appendix D) provides instructions to coders 
about the variables and their respective values. The structure and transparency 
in the process of assigning raw material to the categories limit personal biases 
and increase the intra-coder reliability of the method. As a consequence, 
replications are made feasible (Bryman 2008:274-283).  Thus, despite the 
objectivity-critique, it can be argued that the definition is still valid when 
taking measures to ensure objectivity in the research.  
Another important factor that has been considered is that the variables 
must be closely linked to the research question, the values of each variable 
must be mutually exclusive, and they must be exhaustive so that the coder has 
all necessary values available (Bryman 2008:223-288). To maintain the 
reliability of the analysis, parts of the material were initially coded, before the 
coding schedule and manual were revised. This has ensured that the coding 
schedule and manual are as precise and suitable for the material as possible. 
The limited timeframe of the thesis has not allowed for coding the entire 
sample two times. Yet another strength of the method is that it provides 
displayable results (Bryman 2008:289). 
 With regards to conducting interviews, the structure of semi-structured 
interviews maximizes their reliability (Bryman 2008:437). A methodological 
challenge is that disturbing elements like noise and interruptions can 
potentially affect the informants’ answers, thus threatening the reliability 
(Hellevik 2002 quoted in Nordby 2009:42). This was prevented by either doing 
the interviews in a quiet setting, or by scheduling a phone-interview in advance 
so that the interviewees could devote their full attention to the interview. 
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4.3.2 Validity 
A representative sample is “essential for making valid inference to that 
population” (Riffe et. al. 2005:106). Having included the entire population of 
articles relevant to the communication strategy, the sample for the quantitative 
content analysis is not just representative, it is all-encompassing. The 
representativeness of a sample is crucial for the external validity defined as 
“whether the results of a study can be generalized beyond the specific research 
context in which it was constructed” (Bryman 2008:694). When including the 
entire population of units in the quantitative content analysis, the results of this 
study to a large extent meet the requirements for external validity.  
Given the central role and attention the Norwegian media have given to 
the Norwegian Armed Forces’ mission in Afghanistan, it was expected that the 
entire population of articles would be larger than 74 articles. The limited 
number of units makes it problematic to present the empirical data in 
percentage. As a consequence, the empirical data will be presented as absolute 
values unless they are being compared to data from Kristin Nordby’s study of 
Norwegian media’s Afghanistan coverage (2009). Although a comparison of 
the two datasets may be criticised because Nordby’s sample is much larger 
(399 articles) than the sample in this study, it will still provide an interesting 
comparative perspective to the analysis.  
Moreover, as will be described, 52 out of the 74 articles were produced 
in the two months following the four Norwegian casualties. It is important to 
be aware of these characteristics when discussing the results, and to understand 
the data in light of the circumstances in which the articles were produced. 
However, because the sample includes the entire population of articles, it will 
allow for an accurate analysis of the total coverage in the period relevant to the 
communication strategy for the Norwegian Armed Forces in Afghanistan 2011. 
This analysis will help to increase our understanding of the coverage and 
provide indications of how successful the Norwegian Armed Forces are in 
fulfilling their communication goals. Moreover, this will hopefully constitute a 
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valuable platform for discussing theoretical implications for the media-state 
relation. 
With regards to the quantitative analysis, “Norge i krig” is the only 
documentary that follows the Norwegian soldiers in battle to that extent, and 
over so many episodes.
19
 Furthermore, it had an average audience of 285 000 
viewers (NRK [email] August 4. 2011). This increases its relevance, but it is at 
the same time problematic to generalise based on this case alone. Thus, the 
qualitative analysis constitutes only one of the methodological approaches of 
this study. Addressing the interviews, the six interviewees are all key 
informants that represent the most relevant factors analysed in this study. The 
five journalists represent all of the elite media, and Lindqvist is the head of 
communication of international operations in the Norwegian Armed Forces.  
Face validity is also important to consider when evaluating a research 
method. Face validity is the “concern with whether an indicator appears to 
reflect the content of the concept in question” (Bryman 2008:694).  The first 
group of variables consists of key variables regarding the characteristics of 
media coverage, and most of them are also closely connected to the ethical 
norms of journalism. With regards to the second groups of variables, they are 
deducted from the communication strategy for Afghanistan 2011, and their 
validity has been confirmed by Petter Lindqvist. Thus it can be argued that the 
variables reflect the issues this thesis seeks to address. The face validity is 
further increased by method triangulation. The interviews make it possible to 
ask the actors questions about issues directly related to the research question, 
and the qualitative content analysis will provide a deeper understanding of the 
media coverage.
 20
  
 
                                                 
19
 TV 2 is expected to air a documentary produced by embedded journalists in the late fall of 
2011. Moreover, in the fall of 2010, TV3 sent the documentary “Livredderne i Afghanistan”, 
consisting of two episodes, about the medical personnel in the Norwegian Aeromedical 
Detachment. Due to the narrow scope of the documentary and its limited time frame, it is not 
as relevant for this thesis.  
20
 Internal validity is arguable less relevant with regard to this thesis, because it has not aimed 
at proving causality. 
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5.0 Results 
 
As we recall, this thesis has set out to analyse the characteristics of the 
coverage produced in Afghanistan, by journalists either on media visits or 
while embedded, and to what extent the coverage fulfils the goals of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces’ communication strategy. This chapter will seek to 
concisely present the findings from the quantitative and qualitative content 
analysis respectively.  
The overarching aim of the chapter is to provide empirical data that will 
constitute a solid foundation for answering the three research questions at hand. 
These research questions will be addressed in chapter 6, “Discussion”, where 
the data will be analysed more thoroughly together with the results from the 
semi-structured interviews, and discussed in light of the theoretical framework 
described in chapter 3. 
 
5.1 Quantitative content analysis 
The quantitative content analysis consists of two groups of variables, namely 
the “General characteristics of the coverage” and “The fulfilment of the 
communication strategy”.  The first group includes six variables regarding the 
characteristics of the coverage and the ethical norms of journalism.  
 
A. General characteristics of the coverage 
 
5.1.1 Type of sources 
Figure 5.1 presented below shows that when reporting solely from 
Afghanistan, the journalists interviewed sources from the military and police in 
close to 80 per cent of the articles (blue pillar). When Kristin Nordby analysed 
the Norwegian media’s Afghanistan coverage, including all relevant articles 
regardless of where they were produced, she found that the journalists included 
sources from the military or police in less then 40  per cent of the articles (red 
50 
pillar) (Nordby 2009). This comparison indicates that when reporting solely 
from Afghanistan, the journalists give the military and police far more 
attention. Oppositely, Nordby’s sample employed more politicians. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Type of sources in articles. Coverage produced in Afghanistan 
(Series1) vs. general coverage (Series2) (percentage [N=74, N=399]).
21
 
 
The disparity of sources in the sample analysed here is also more limited than 
in the coverage analysed by Nordby. Nordby’s sample has a higher frequency 
of scholarly, humanitarian, civilian and Taliban-sources. 
 
5.1.2 Number of sources 
Also the number of sources interviewed in each article provides enlightening 
information about the nature of the coverage. Compared to Nordby’s sample, 
the figure below illustrates the differences. As many as 39 of the articles 
produced by journalists visiting the Norwegian military in Afghanistan 
(Series1), employ two sources or less. This constitutes more than 50 per cent of 
the articles. The corresponding share for Nordby’s sample (Series2) is 37 per 
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 This variable was coded using another program then the rest. The raw data is unfortunately 
not possible to present in appendix E as the other variables are, but can be provided on 
request. 
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cent.  When looking at articles with more than three sources, we see that the 
frequency is higher in Nordby’s sample on all but one value. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Number of sources in article. Coverage produced in 
Afghanistan (Series1) vs. general coverage (Series2) (percentage [N=74, 
N=399]). 
 
These data indicate that when journalists report from Afghanistan, they 
interview fewer sources than they would have done if they reported from 
Norway. 
 
5.1.3 Framing 
One of the key features of any article, and a feature especially interesting with 
regards to a communication strategy and the subsequent media agenda 
presented, is how it is framed.  
 
Figure 5.3 Frequency of frames in articles (absolute value [N=74]). 
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Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of the tone of the framing in the entire 
population of articles. It can be observed that 14 of the articles are positively 
framed, and as much as 42 articles employ a neutral frame. Combining these 
two shows that 56 articles are either positive or neutral in their framing. 
Moreover, only 18 articles are critical towards the Norwegian Armed Forces, 
their mission or its results. Though there are more critical than positive frames, 
we see that the combination of neutral and positive frames heavily outnumbers 
the critical ones.  
 
5.1.4 Genre 
Moving on to the different genres employed in the 74 articles, figure 5.4 shows 
that the reportage has the highest frequency, and is employed in 36 articles. A 
reportage allows the reporter to show his or her presence on the location, and 
provides “sent and colour” to the story.  
 
 Figure 5.4 Frequency of genres of article (absolute value [N=74]). 
 
When taking into account the high frequency of reportages, it is interesting to 
observe that it was produced only 21 news articles. Critical perspectives are 
arguably presented more often in news articles than in the “softer” reportages 
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and features. Elisabeth Eide explains that the topics addressed in a reportage 
“in general have more positive connotations, and are more exploratory” (Eide 
2005:248). Thus, the high salience of the genre reportage is in line with the 
frames employed. Another finding is that the population consists of only three 
feature stories. A feature will ideally require more time and sources than other 
genres. 
 
5.1.5 Topic of article 
The attention given to the four Norwegian casualties in the media coverage is 
evident when analysing the key topic of the individual article. Figure 5.5 shows 
that 27 of the articles had the four casualties as its key topic.  
 
 
Figure 5.5 Frequency of topics in articles (absolute value [N=74]). 
 
When the Norwegian casualties represent the key topic, the articles often 
address the combat action constituted by the road bomb that killed the four 
soldiers as well. However, the combat action itself, in that context, or in other 
articles, is seldom the key topic of the article. This is reflected in the statistics, 
which show that only seven articles had combat as its key topic. Additionally, 
despite the large impact the four casualties had on the media agenda, it can be 
observed that also other issues are communicated as key topics. First, the 
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security situation can be understood as a natural topic to emphasise in such a 
situation as Afghanistan. This is the key topic of 14 articles. Furthermore, the 
effect of the Norwegian mission is the key topic in 9 of the articles. 
 
5.1.6 Month 
As already stated, a majority of the articles in the population were produced in 
the aftermath of the four Norwegian casualties. The figure below shows how 
the 74 articles are distributed over time. 
 
Figure 5.6 Frequency of articles in different months (absolute value 
[N=74]). 
 
The figure illustrates the impact the four casualties had on the coverage of 
Afghanistan, with 52 articles written in June and July 2010. This may have 
influenced the results from the other variables, and must be taken into account 
when discussing the data. Moreover, figure 5.6 also illustrates that the 
frequency of articles in the rest of the period is limited, but relatively 
consistent.
22
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  A frequency table of how many articles the different newspapers produced is provided in 
appendix E 
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B. The fulfilment of the communication strategy 
 
Now that the results of the variables addressing the general characteristics of 
the coverage have been presented, the results of the second group of variables, 
namely the ones deducted from the communication strategy of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces, can be described. 
 
5.1.7 Mentoring  
The first pie chart (figure 5.7) shows the salience of the mentoring and 
cooperation with Afghan security forces.  
 
 
Figure 5.7 Frequency of articles describing mentoring (absolute value 
[N=74]). 
 
Only 4 out of the 74 articles have this issue as its main focus, and as much as 
59 articles do not address mentoring at all. Being one of the key military 
objectives of the Norwegian Armed Forces in Afghanistan, and an important 
goal in their communication strategy, this is arguably a disappointing result for 
the Norwegian Armed Forces. 
 
5.1.8 International effort 
Moving on to the goal of communicating the importance of a broad 
international effort, figure 5.8 shows that this issue is more prominent in the 
articles than the mentorship. Although only three articles employ the issue as 
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its man focus, it is mentioned in 30 of the articles. A total of 33 articles, close 
to half of the sample, touch upon the issue. 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Frequency of articles describing importance of international 
effort (absolute value [N=74]). 
 
Though it is still 41 articles that do not mention the role of NATO, the ISAF-
forces, or the cooperation between the different nations operating in 
Afghanistan, the issue receives a fair amount of attention. The importance of 
the international effort is often portrayed through descriptions of how the 
different members of the alliance work together and support each other. The 
coverage fulfils this communication goal fairly well, but arguably not to the 
extent that should satisfy the Norwegian Armed Forces. 
 
5.1.9 Tasks and competence 
A communication goal that is fulfilled to a far greater extent, is the tasks and 
competence of the Norwegian Armed Forces. Figure 5.9 shows that the 
journalists who report from Afghanistan very often describe the skills of the 
soldiers, as well as their tasks and role in Afghanistan. It is an issue presented 
in 58 of the 74 articles, and is the main focus in 8 of them. 
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Figure 5.9 Frequency of articles describing the tasks and competence of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces (absolute value [N=74]). 
 
This data can also be seen in light of the type of sources interviewed. As 
described in section 5.1.1, the analysis shows that military or police-sources are 
interviewed in almost 80 per cent of the population of articles. This 
characteristic is arguably reflected in the salience of the tasks and competence 
of the soldiers visualised in figure 5.10. 
 
5.1.10 Combat 
The last goal deducted from the communication strategy, is to downplay 
combat action.  
 
Figure 5.10 Frequency of articles describing combat (absolute value 
[N=74]). 
 
As the empirical data show, the Norwegian Armed Forces have not been 
successful in limiting the focus on combat action in the coverage. In total, 46 of 
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the articles describe Norwegian soldiers in combat. For 12 of these it is the 
main focus. This shows the high salience of combat action in the articles.
23
 
 
5.2 Qualitative content analysis 
Now that the results from the quantitative analysis have been presented, it will 
be valuable to address the results from the qualitative analysis of “Norge i krig 
– Oppdrag Afghanistan”. This will hopefully increase our understanding of the 
coverage produced when the journalists have been embedded with the 
Norwegian Armed Forces.  
As described earlier, scholars usually divide texts into three types of 
discourses: a descriptive discourse, a story, or an argumentative discourse 
(Østbye et. al. 2002:71). In this perspective, “Norge i krig” is arguably a 
“story”. In line with the general characteristics of a “story” (Østbye et. al 
2002:71) “Norge i krig” draws connections between different actors and 
elements, and describe a causal chain of events when telling the story about 
what the Norwegian troops do in Afghanistan. It focuses on subjects and shows 
“human interest” when portraying the three main characters: soldiers Sigve and 
Steve, and Rune Solberg, chief of the Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction 
Team (PRT 15). The documentary does not only cover their professional lives, 
it also portrays their personal features, such as families, religious beliefs and 
what they feel about their mission in Afghanistan.  
Since the documentary can be understood as a “story”, it has been 
analysed through the actantial model developed by Algirdas Julien Greimas. 
The model, described in chapter 4.2, helps to identify what messages the 
documentary communicate, how they are communicated, and to what extent 
the goals in the communication strategy of the Norwegian Armed Forces are 
fulfilled. Furthermore, the model will serve as a structural framework when 
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 Although 12 articles have been coded as having combat action as their main focus, only 7 
articles were coded as having combat action as its key topic (figure 5.5). This discrepancy is a 
result of the differences between the two variables. Key topic reflects the one key issue 
presented in the article, whereas an article’s “main focus” reflects how salient an issue is 
throughout the article. 
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presenting the results of the qualitative analysis. In addition to the actants in 
Greimas’ model, the concept of framing will be employed to help understand 
how the messages are being communicated. 
 
5.2.1 Object 
The overarching object communicated in all of the six episodes is that the 
Norwegian Armed Forces, through the mentoring of Afghan Security Forces, 
seek to create stability in Afghanistan, strengthen the security and increase the 
control of the Afghan forces. Only two minutes into the first episode, the 
importance of mentorship is emphasised by Rune Solberg: “Our most 
important mission is to help the Afghans so that they can make it on their 
own.” Another illustrative example is when a text written by the filmmakers is 
presented to the audience in the second episode. It states: “The allied countries 
(ISAF) wish for the Afghans to take responsibility for their own security.”  
The documentary also shows the more specific tasks carried out by the 
Norwegian soldiers in order to meet the overall objectives, and the competence 
inherent in the Norwegian troops. In the third episode the object is to increase 
the security during the local elections. We follow the OMLT – the Norwegian 
mentoring-team – that contributes to the assistance of the Afghan police and 
the Afghan army. Major Christian Slinning states that “The mission of OMLT 
is to coach, teach and mentor.” In the fourth episode, Rune Solberg describes 
the competence of the Norwegian soldiers to the journalist: “When it comes to 
planning, synchronising and coordinating operations, we can contribute a great 
deal.”  
Throughout the documentary, combat action is portrayed as a necessary 
means to fulfil the objectives of the Norwegian Armed Forces, but this receives 
a great deal of attention particularly from the fourth episode and onwards. 
Although the documentary to a large extent focuses on military aims, the fifth 
episode shows that Rune Solberg also tries to contribute to the development in 
Faryab. This perspective contributes to the image of Norwegian soldiers as 
helpful and compassionate. 
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 The final episode in many ways captures the overarching objective of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces, and the problems they face. When seeking to 
establish contact between the Pashtun village Ghalbala and the provincial 
authorities, Rune Solberg and the Norwegian troops encourage the Afghan 
leaders to take charge of the security situation and development in Faryab. One 
scene shows a frustrated Solberg:  “Now I was irritated. They are used to us 
fixing things for them, now they have to fix it themselves.” But Solberg also 
faces criticism from the elders in Ghalbala: “Foreign troops have given us 
promises for 7-8 years, but nothing has been done”, one says. On his last day in 
Meymaneh, Solberg tells the journalist about the prospects of fulfilling their 
objectives: “We will never manage to beat the Taliban. That’s my prediction.” 
 
5.2.2 Recipient 
The documentary presents the Afghanistan’s National Security Forces (ANSF) 
as the recipient of the Norwegian mission. As Solberg states in the first 
episode: “Of course we contribute to an improved Afghanistan.” There are only 
a few occasions where it is the Afghan people who constitute the recipient.  An 
example of the latter is when Sigve explains that: “Our mission is to help the 
weak […], and that is in line with Christianity I live by.” This contributes to the 
message that Norway is in Afghanistan to make Afghanistan a better place for 
the civilians.  
 The relationship between the Norwegian PRT and the Afghan forces is 
often communicated through one of two perspectives: either when co-operating 
in the battlefield, or when Rune Solberg has administrative meetings with his 
ISAF-colleagues and Afghan officials. But it is also shown through more 
specific tasks, such as building roads in the Pashtun-areas and the effort to 
secure the elections.  
The fourth episode provides a very clear visual of who benefits from the 
Norwegian mission in Afghanistan. Christian Slinning, major in the mentoring 
unit OMLT, teaches the Afghan soldiers how to read maps and how to inform 
about their position. However, the Afghans occasionally also critique the 
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ISAF-mission for its lack of progress. Though the critique shows the negative 
features of the mission, it also communicates that Norway are in Afghanistan 
as a part of a larger coalition.  
 
5.2.3 Subject 
The subject in the documentary is the Norwegian Armed Forces represented by 
PRT 15. When the documentary follows the subjects Rune Solberg, Sigve and 
Steve closely, the tasks and competence of the Norwegian soldiers is efficiently 
communicated as well.  
One example is the second episode, where Sigve states that “Our task is 
to be the manoeuvring element for the PRT, and that means supporting the 
Afghan security forces.” Other examples are when the Norwegian soldiers 
teach the Afghan soldiers how to read maps and coordinates, and when they 
secure road-bombs. Accompanied by thrilling music we see how the well-
trained soldiers in a controlled manner trigger de road-bombs, thus making the 
roads of Faryab more secure.  
Through the communication of PRT 15 as the subject, the audience is 
also introduced to the violent nature of their mission. One example of the focus 
on combat action in the documentary is when Norwegian soldiers have fired at 
the enemy. A soldier says: “I saw he was killed!”, and he and Sigve respond by 
laughing. Sigve explains to the camera: “We have sort of a cowboy-attitude as 
humour.” 
 
5.2.4 Helper 
With regards to the helper, an actant relevant when emphasising the 
importance of the broad international effort in Afghanistan, it is also 
communicated, but not as clearly as the other actants. The helpers of the 
Norwegian Armed forces are most often presented through administrative 
meetings with Rune Solberg and his ISAF-colleagues. One of the first insights 
given to the international coalition is when Rune Solberg has a sit-down with 
the chief of the American troops, and talks to the camera about the importance 
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of cooperating with the Americans. This relationship is emphasised throughout 
the documentary, and establish the Norwegian mission as a part of the broader, 
international ISAF-operation. 
 Another illustrative example is when the second episode informs that as 
much as 130.000 allied ISAF-forces are stationed in Afghanistan, and that only 
500 of these are Norwegian. This communicates that the Norwegian Armed 
Forces are a small piece in a larger puzzle, and operate in Afghanistan as a 
result of the Western coalition.  
 
5.2.5 Enemy 
The Taliban represent the main enemy throughout the documentary: they try to 
sabotage the elections, they have established a stronghold in an Afghan village, 
and they are the main obstacle when the Norwegian soldiers try to reach out to 
the Pashtuns. Thus, the Taliban is communicated as the main obstacle to most 
of the tasks the Norwegian Armed Forces set out to accomplish. This 
contributes to the “enemy-image” of the Taliban established by the NATO in 
general, and U.S. in particular (Fondenes 2011:22).  
It is interesting to observe that the final episode shows the obstacle 
represented by the Afghan forces and the provincial authorities themselves. 
Their inability to take responsibility for their own missions is presented as a 
major cause to why Rune Solberg has enjoyed limited success in achieving his 
goals in Faryab. This is also the causal interpretation of several other situations. 
 
5.2.6 Sender 
The only actant in Greimas’ model not communicated clearly in the 
documentary is the sender. In the context of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ and 
ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan, the sender would arguably be the United 
Nations Security Council that through several resolutions have given them the 
mandate to carry out their mission. These resolutions constitute the justification 
for ISAF’s presence in Afghanistan, and it would be beneficial for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces if this had been communicated more clearly. 
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5.2.7 Framing 
Having described the actants communicated in “Norge i krig”, an analysis of 
the framing of the documentary will indicate the tone and context in which the 
messages are communicated. One important factor in that respect is the intro 
played prior to each episode. The intro combines dramatic music with images 
of the attack on World Trade Centre. In between screams and dramatic music, 
we hear George Bush state “Freedom itself was attacked this morning and 
freedom will be defended”, in addition to his famous words: “Either you are 
with us, or you are with the terrorists.” We see Barack Obama using the term 
“just war”, and Jens Stoltenberg telling Norwegian soldiers: “You have chosen 
to go out and defend the principals the society at home is based upon.” In doing 
so, the whole documentary is framed through the democratic justification of the 
war. An additional, but just as important effect is that the link between 
Norway’s mission and our western allies is firmly established.  
The first four episodes are to a large extent presented in a positive 
frame, though the critical perspectives increase from episode to episode. It can 
be argued that the general frame employed, similar to the objective 
communicated, is that the Norwegian troops are in Afghanistan in order to 
stabilise and democratise the state, and help the Afghans help themselves. 
Thus, the frame provides a causal interpretation of what is happening. This 
“central organizing idea” contributes to fulfilling the goals of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces’ communication strategy.  
Surprisingly, the documentary only briefly addresses the four 
Norwegian casualties. In a sequence lasting no more than ten minutes, an 
emotional Rune Solberg is portrayed. But the Norwegian Minister of Defence, 
Grete Faremo, is also quoted from her speech to the Norwegian soldiers, 
stating that: “They died so that we shall feel safe and secure.” Thus, the 
justification of the mission is communicated in the midst of the tragedy.  
It is arguably not until the fifth and sixth episode that we see a clear 
critical frame, with the hopelessness of the situation in northern Afghanistan as 
the “central organizing idea”. Through familiar images of underdeveloped 
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villages and poor civilians, and the expressed discontent by Norwegian 
soldiers, the audience understands the frustration and challenges the Norwegian 
Armed Forces face in Afghanistan. Rune Solberg shares his soldiers’ 
frustration: “The army is too small to deliver a substantial contribution over 
time.” The causal interpretation of the frame is that despite a heroic effort of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces, they have not succeeded in transferring control 
to Afghanistan’s National Security Forces due to limited resources, and the 
problems emphasized earlier with the Afghan forces.  
 
5.3 Summarising the quantitative and qualitative analysis 
The results from the quantitative analysis of the 74 articles show that both the 
number and disparity of sources is limited. There are also relatively few critical 
frames communicated, the coverage is dominated by the genre reportage, and 
there is a high frequency of articles having the four casualties as their key 
topic. 
 Looking at the four variables derived from the communication strategy 
of the Norwegian Armed Forces, the empirical data indicate that the success of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces in communicating their goals vary greatly. First, 
the tasks and competence of the troops is the communication goal fulfilled to 
the largest extent by the newspaper articles. However, a second finding is that 
the issue of mentoring the Afghan security forces is seldom included in the 
articles. Third, the importance of the international cooperation is 
communicated, but not to a large extent. Fourth, combat action is given a great 
deal of attention. Thus, it can be argued that the Norwegian Armed Forces have 
not been able to fulfil all of their communication goals through the 74 articles 
in large produced on media visits.  
With regards to the NRK-documentary, analysed in light of Greimas’ 
model, the following results can be observed:  
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Model 5.1 Greimas' actantial model applied to “Norge i krig”. 
 
The qualitative content analysis has shown how the documentary, through the 
communication of these actants, fulfils all but one of the goals deducted from 
the communication strategy of the Norwegian Armed Forces – namely the 
intent to downplay combat action. Combat constitutes a highly dominant issue 
in the documentary. However, the mentoring of Afghan security forces, the 
tasks and competence of the soldiers, and how the Norwegian effort is both a 
result of and dependant on international alliances, are well communicated. 
Communication that is beneficial to the Norwegian Armed Forces is notably 
emphasised throughout the documentary by combining live images with 
written texts. The texts help the viewers interpret the images shown, which 
results in a positive synergetic effect for the Norwegian military.  
 Analysing the framing of the episodes, it can be argued that the first four 
episodes employ mainly positive or neutral frames with regards to the 
Norwegian mission. The last two episodes employ a more critical frame than 
the first four, but the failures of the Norwegian mission are often attributed to 
the shortcomings of the Afghan security forces. Another feature that arguably 
favours the image of Norwegian Armed Forces is the limited number and 
disparity of sources. Norwegian soldiers constitute the three main characters, 
and determine much of the discourse.  
 
 
 
Communication-axis: 
 
Project-axis: 
 
Conflict-axis: 
 
Object: 
Security and 
stability 
Sender: 
Unknown 
Recipient: 
ANSF and 
Afghan 
civilians 
Helper: 
ISAF 
Subject: 
PRT 
 
Enemy: 
Taliban 
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6.0 Discussion 
 
The area of media and communication has been attributed an increasingly 
significant role with regards to warfare and the battle for public support. In the 
context of Afghanistan, the information domain has been given much attention 
due to the escalated sophistication of the Taliban’s communication. As we 
recall, General McChrystal noted that ISAF needs to take “aggressive actions 
to win the important battle of perception” (McChrystal 2009:40). The 
Norwegian Armed Forces has met this challenge through developing a 
communication strategy directly applied to Afghanistan 2011. This thesis has 
set out to study Norwegian media’s Afghanistan coverage, and to explore the 
extent to which the Norwegian Armed Forces have been successful in fulfilling 
the goals in their strategy when inviting journalists to Afghanistan. 
According to the hypotheses, it was expected that the journalists leave 
behind central ethical norms of journalism such as a high number and disparity 
of sources, in addition to critical perspectives and free flow of information, 
when they join media visits or let themselves embed with the Norwegian 
Armed Forces. Despite this, it was still expected that the Norwegian Armed 
Forces would fail to downplay combat action and to communicate the more 
specific goal of mentoring Afghan forces. The third hypothesis states that the 
empirical findings show that one must open for a discussion of the established 
theories of media-state relations, and the extent to which they cover all relevant 
factors.  
The thesis will now discuss the empirical data more thoroughly in order 
to address these three hypotheses, and answer the three research questions at 
hand.  
 
6.1 What characterises the coverage? 
The first research question this thesis seeks to answer is “What characterises 
the Norwegian media coverage produced on “media visits” or while 
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“embedded” in Afghanistan?”. In order to answer this question, the first groups 
of variables from the quantitative content analysis will be discussed in light of 
the theoretical framework of the thesis, together with relevant findings from the 
qualitative analysis and nuanced statements from the semi-structured 
interviews.   
 
6.1.1 Type and number of sources 
From a theoretical perspective, The Norwegian Armed Forces represent the 
“news sources” in McCombs’ model. According to the model, the news source 
“provides the information for news stories” and will “at times” be successful in 
setting the agenda (McCombs 2004:117). As the empirical data show, the 
diversity of sources is limited in the coverage, and the Norwegian Armed 
Forces constitute a highly dominant voice. Representatives from the military 
and police are interviewed in close to 80 per cent of the articles, thus 
emphasizing the definitional power inherent in the Norwegian military. In the 
coverage analysed by Nordby (2009), where the sample included 399 
Norwegian articles on Afghanistan, regardless of where the journalists were 
reporting from, the police and military were interviewed in less then 40 per 
cent of the articles. This indicates that the setting of media visits increases the 
prominence and potential influence of the Norwegian Armed Forces as a 
source. Moreover, less then 5 per cent of the articles are based on political 
statements. This shows that the coverage is in congruence with the aim of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces to leave the political discussion to the politicians. 
Dagbladet’s journalist Einar Hagvaag explains why he thinks representatives of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces are so dominant in the coverage: “This shows 
what sources you have access to when you stay on the Norwegian bases. 
Military sources and politicians will dominate in a conflict such as 
Afghanistan. Though there are too few civilians interviewed, the fact that no 
members of Taliban are interviewed shows the challenges a reporter has with 
security”. The high salience of military sources can also be understood in light 
of the empirical data from Respons Analyse’s survey with 500 journalists. 
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When asked “how much faith do you have in military officers?”, 36 per cent of 
the respondents answered “fairly much” (Respons Analyse 2011). This can 
further help to explain why military- and police sources are given so much 
attention in the coverage. 
The findings from the analysis of the NRK-documentary further support 
the data from the articles. Rune Solberg is by far the most central source, and 
the soldiers Sigve and Steve are also given much attention. The focus on 
military topics is strong, and the documentary includes few alternative 
perspectives such as the Taliban’s, the humanitarian situation, or the negative 
consequences of the Norwegian presence. NRK-journalist Marius Arnesen 
confirms that being embedded results in fewer perspectives and less diversity 
in their selection of sources: “Definitely. We have chosen one position from 
where we cover the conflict, namely the Norwegian Armed Forces and not the 
civilians. Ideally, we should have included both, but that is not possible when 
embedded.” This normative perspective is supported by the research conducted 
by Eivind Solberg-Hansen Fondenes. He analysed all the articles written on the 
four casualties in the following weeks after the attack, articles produced in both 
Norway and in Afghanistan (Fondenes 2011). Fondenes concludes that it is 
“evident that the critical coverage increases when a newspaper supplements 
with sources not representing the Norwegian Armed Forces or the Norwegian 
government” (Fondenes 2011:107). 
The empirical data with regards to the type of sources employed support 
the potentially influential role of the Norwegian Armed Forces as a source 
inherent in McCombs’ model. Moreover, the empirical data confirm one of the 
features in Bennett’s indexing theory, namely that a prerequisite to, and a 
feature of, indexing is that it is the official source “who get the voice on the 
stories” (Bennett et. al. 2007:49 quoted in McQuail 2010:243).  
The dominating role of the Norwegian Armed Forces as a source could 
enable the organisation to communicate all of their expressed goals in the 
communication strategy. However, according to McCombs’ model, there is a 
factor with even greater influence on the media agenda, namely the journalistic 
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norms and traditions. Bennett addresses ethical norms as well, but does 
arguably not attribute the same significance to them as McCombs. In the 
context of this study, the journalistic norms are closely connected to how the 
journalists relate to their sources.  
It has already been argued that the diversity of sources is limited. 
Looking at a second perspective with regards to the ethical norms of 
journalism, namely the number of sources interviewed, the findings further 
strengthen the perception of the Norwegian Armed Forces as the prevailing 
source. The value with the highest frequency is two sources (21 articles). 
Furthermore, there are almost as many articles with only one source as there 
are articles with three sources (16 and 17 articles respectively). This indicates 
that the Norwegian Armed Forces are not only the most salient type of source, 
they are often the only source. Compared to the coverage analysed by Nordby 
(2009), we also see that the journalists interview less sources when they are 
embedded or on media visits. With regards to the documentary “Norge i krig” 
there are slightly more sources included than in the 74 articles. However, no 
more than two or three sources are given considerable attention in each 
episode. 
VG-journalist Rune Thomas Ege is surprised when confronted with the 
statistics: “Ideally more sources should have been interviewed. One 
explanation is that a journalist often talks to many sources, but in the end it is a 
superior who makes the official statement.” This explanation is also supported 
by the Norwegian Armed Forces themselves. Of the 500 officers interviewed in 
the survey conducted by Respons Analyse (2011), only 5 per cent state that 
they answer questions from journalists themselves. Einar Hagvaag explains 
that the low number of sources could be a result of the setting in which the 
articles were produced: “When you are reporting on the four casualties, you 
don’t need as many sources as when you write a story trying to explain the 
complexity of the conflict.” Regardless of the different explanations to why 
there are so few sources, and why the sources often are military, these 
journalistic features go against paragraph 1.2 and 3.2 in “Vær varsom-
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plakaten”, which state that “the press has a particular responsibility to ensure 
that different views are communicated” and that according to the ethical norms 
of journalism, one should “strive to achieve a broad and relevant selection of 
sources”.  
A third perspective with regards to the ethical norms of journalism and 
the role of the sources involves the constraints practiced by the Norwegian 
Armed Forces when journalists visit them in Afghanistan. As we recall from 
chapter 2.2.3, the interviewees have different perceptions regarding their 
degree of freedom on media visits, but Petter Lindqvist is clear with regards to 
the fact that constraints are applied to classified information. This is also 
confirmed by the requirements in the ISAF-contract referred to earlier (ISAF 
2011). Furthermore, Kristin Solberg argues that some of the soldiers are 
protected from the press, and that others “don’t tell the entire truth”. Anders 
Sømme Hammer goes much further when he states: “There is absolutely no 
free access.” When accepting such limitations, a journalist goes against 
principles expressed by his or her colleagues. When Respons Analyse asked 
500 journalists what kind of constraints they would accept in a war zone, 38 
per cent answered that they would accept no constraints (Respons Analyse 
2011). Moreover, the limitations are in conflict with paragraph 1.3 in “Vær 
varsom-plakaten”: “The press can’t give into pressure from anyone who seeks 
to hinder an open debate, free flow of information or free access to sources”.  
A fourth ethical perspective in journalism is the nature of the 
relationship that evolves between journalists and their sources. In April 2011, I 
interviewed Steve about the premiere of “Norge i krig” for an article in 
Dagbladet. Steve told me that: “The journalist became our buddy. It’s a bit 
scary, but he became one of the guys” (Steve quoted in Dagbladet, April 2. 
2011). Keeping in mind that the documentary seldom focus on controversial 
issues, and spend only ten minutes on the Norwegian casualties, one could 
argue that the close relationship described by Steve is reflected in a reduction 
of critical perspectives in the documentary. However, Marius Arnesen, one of 
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the journalists following Steve, has a somewhat different understanding of the 
relationship:  
 
I would not describe it as a friendship, but as a professional 
acquaintance and a relationship based on trust. We got so close that we 
could confide in each other, but it was never on the expense of my 
independence. I had to balance between being a journalist and ‘one of 
the guys’, and I had to focus more on that balance the longer time I 
spent with the soldiers. But I never crossed the line. It did not make it 
more difficult to ask critical questions, and I think we communicated the 
criticism the soldiers directed upward in the system. When you meet a 
group as tight as these guys, it is not easy to get close. You have to be a 
part of the group, so I joined them in their training and in the bar for a 
coke. At that point I reduced my role as a journalist, and they opened up. 
  
Anders Sømme Hammer has not been embedded with the Norwegian Armed 
Forces, but with American, Canadian and Dutch troops. Without having seen 
“Norge i krig”, he is more critical towards embedding because of the 
relationship that develops between the journalists and their sources:  
 
When you live with the soldiers, it does something to you. You get used 
to analyse the conflict from the soldiers’ perspective. In stead of 
challenging the soldiers, there is a big chance you describe their lives 
and adopt their perspectives and analysis without resistance. That should 
not be the main perspective. Of what I have seen so far, the majority of 
stories produced by embedded journalists are in line with the intentions 
of the Norwegian Armed Forces. The journalists show an obvious 
sympathy for the soldiers, share their perspectives and ask few critical 
questions. 
 
Although Arnesen states that he never crossed the line between being a friend 
and being a journalist, it is interesting to observe that Steve experienced it 
differently. Moreover, it is problematic that relations that potentially could 
compromise the independence of the journalist arise. 
With regards to media visits, most of the interviewees note that when the 
journalists travel on brief trips there is not enough time for a close bond 
between the soldiers and the journalists to develop. If the journalist lives in the 
camp for a week or two however, the situation is arguably different. Einar 
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Hagvaag explains that as a journalist “you relate to the soldiers in another way 
after some weeks”.  
The already dominant position of the Norwegian Armed Forces as a 
source becomes even stronger when seeking explanations to why the 
journalists choose to visit the Norwegian military in Afghanistan. One 
explanation given by many of the interviewees is the security situation. 
According to them, it is far too dangerous to travel independently in the 
northern Afghanistan where the Norwegian soldiers operate. In plain words, 
Norwegian journalists to a large extent depend on embedding and media visits 
in order to cover the war. Most of the interviewees also state that the 
Norwegian journalists are too dependent on the facilitation provided by the 
Norwegian Armed Forces. “Because of the security situation, we are very 
dependent on such trips. From a journalistic perspective, we are too 
dependent”, Einar Hagvaag states. Marius Arnesen is disappointed with 
Norwegian newsrooms: “To me it’s a mystery that there are not more media 
outlets with a designated correspondent down there.” The journalists’ 
dependence on the Norwegian Armed Forces becomes even more problematic 
when 62 per cent of the military personnel interviewed answer that they regard 
journalists as “easily influenced”. 
The dependence on the Norwegian Armed Forces, together with the 
potential close relationships that develop between the journalists and the 
soldiers, are arguably in conflict with paragraph 2.2 in “Vær varsom-plakaten”, 
which states the reporters “must protect their integrity and credibility to be able 
to act free and independent in relation with individuals or groups […]”.   
The empirical data discussed in this section confirms the “reliance on 
government, elites and experts”, as described by Herman and Chomsky’s 
propaganda model (2002:2). Furthermore, the reliance on these sources may 
indicate that the strong position of the military sources as “authorised knowers” 
increase due to limited knowledge on military issues in the newsrooms (Allern 
1997:208; Schiager 2011:14). This is also emphasised by Petter Lindqvist who 
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state that a lack of knowledge regarding warfare and the Norwegian Armed 
Forces results in “less qualified questions”.  
 
6.1.2 Framing  
An important characteristic in the analysis of how the Norwegian Armed 
Forces are portrayed in the coverage is the framing of the news items. As we 
recall, the analysis has focused on the tone of the frames employed. While 
Petter Lindqvist, and thus the Norwegian Armed Forces, claims that their main 
concern is to communicate the reality on the ground and that “critical 
journalism is characterised by qualified questions”, it is not a bold statement to 
argue that they would prefer a mainly neutral or positive coverage. The data 
from the qualitative content analysis show that only 18 out of the 74 articles 
employ a critical frame, and that the majority of the articles employ either a 
neutral or positive frame. VG-reporter Rune Thomas Ege argues that the 
coverage conducted at home normally would include more critical voices: “But 
the quality of the journalism does not necessarily improve just by including 
criticism”, he claims. Ege also states that the empirical data have to be 
understood in light of the four Norwegian casualties: “There is a time for 
everything. It is natural that it was not more critical frames in the immediate 
aftermath of the killed soldiers.” This explanation is in line with Fondenes’ 
analysis of all the articles written on the four casualties in the subsequent 
weeks (Fondenes 2011). Fondenes found that despite a broad coverage of the 
incident, there are very few articles on the war in general, and Norway’s role in 
particular, and that the drama and individual stories were the prioritised topics 
(Fondenes 2011:57). Also, the Norwegian casualties were, opposed to the 
civilian victims, largely presented as “worthy victims” (Fondenes 2011:110). 
The lack of stories putting the Norwegian effort in a larger, and potentially 
more critical perspective, shows that the media reflects the official “story line” 
of the Norwegian Armed Forces, especially with regards to decisive issues 
such as Norwegian casualties. This is in line with Bennett’s notion of indexing.  
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Looking at the documentary “Norge i krig”, the thesis has argued that 
only two out of the six episodes employ a clearly critical frame. Marius 
Arnesen agrees to only parts of the analysis: “I agree that the framing is 
somewhat skewered. But I don’t agree that four of the episodes are mainly 
positive. Also you have to take into account how a documentary is produced. 
You need to build anticipation and describe characters.” Arnesen also explains 
why they did not include more than 10 minutes on the four Norwegian 
casualties in the documentary. “First of all, we were not in Meymaneh when it 
happened. Second, we feel that the sequence told the story quite well. Maybe 
we could have used the situation to be more critical, maybe not. But we asked 
many critical questions, such as ‘is it worth it?’”. Having experienced 
embedding himself, Anders Sømme Hammer describes some of the 
mechanisms operating when embedded: “The military seeks to create 
understanding for the soldiers. They do not try to promote critical journalism. 
And that is not their job. It is the responsibility of the journalist and his or her 
editor.” Linking this statement to the notion of indexing, what Sømme Hammer 
arguably is saying is that when the media exclude critical perspectives and 
index the coverage in terms of the message sent from the sources, it contributes 
to create understanding amongst the population for the Norwegian Armed 
Forces. This is exactly the Norwegian Armed Forces seek to achieve.  
Drawing upon the extensive selection of data collected from the 
analyses and interviews, it can be argued that media visits and embedding 
promote positive frames in the media agenda communicated, frames that are 
beneficial to the Norwegian Armed Forces.  Moreover, we have seen examples 
of frames that have been more or less copied from the frames employed by the 
official sources. One example is the introduction of “Norge i krig” which 
frames the Norwegian mission through the democratic justification of the war, 
and thus sets the tone for the whole documentary. Examples from the articles 
analysed include stories that frame the mentoring of Afghan forces as 
Norway’s exit strategy. As we recall, this is very similar to what Grete Faremo 
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has stated: “The goal is that in the in the spring of 2011, the Afghans will take 
on the responsibility of the first provinces” (Faremo January 2011).   
Furthermore, it is interesting to investigate the division communicated in 
the documentary between the “subject” represented by the Norwegian Armed 
Forces, and the “recipient” constituted by the Afghan security forces and 
civilians. This “we-they”-dichotomy corresponds with what Elisabeth Eide 
(2002) found in her analyses of the representation of India and Indians in A-
magasinet. Eide argues that the “Norwegian or western helper” is represented 
“both as a ‘hero’ and as the most authoritative source regarding information of 
the lives of the Other” (Eide 2002:331). The quantitative findings of this thesis 
with regards to both the dominant role of the Norwegian Armed Forces as a 
source and how they are framed in the articles further support Eide’s argument.  
Based on the empirical data discussed above, it can be argued that the 
Norwegian Armed Forces should be content with the framing of the coverage 
from Afghanistan, and that these frames help to communicate a favourable 
media agenda to the public. When taking into account that 61 per cent out of 
500 journalists state that they find the media’s coverage of Afghanistan too 
little critical (Respons Analyse 2011), it further strengthens the argument. 
Finally, the tone of the framing is also interesting with regards to the 
ethical norms of journalism. Paragraph 1.2 in “Vær varsom-plakaten” states 
that: “The press maintains important tasks such as information, debate and a 
critical perspective on society.” When only 18 out of the 74 articles, and 2 out 
of the 6 episodes, employ a critical frame, the coverage cannot be characterised 
as particularly critical. Thus we see that the overall coverage has a positive or 
neutral tone, and it can be inferred that paragraph 1.2 in “Vær varsom-
plakaten” is not sufficiently adhered to.  
 
6.1.3 Genre and topic 
The results of the variables genre and topic are also interesting with regards to 
the characteristics of the coverage because they provide insight to both the 
issues addressed by the media – and in what structure those issues are 
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presented. The empirical data show that there are relatively few “news articles” 
present in the sample compared to the genre “reportage”. Taking into account 
that most of the journalists who travel to Afghanistan are news reporters, one 
could expect to see more articles reporting on hard news. Moreover, the 
reportage in general has a more “positive connotation” (Eide 2005:248), and 
the high frequency of this genre is thus in line with the positive and neutral 
framings discussed above. These features strengthen the argument that it is the 
Norwegian Armed Forces who set much of the agenda on such trips, and that 
the access to relevant sources of news is limited. Moreover, the low frequency 
of feature stories indicates that the reporters have limited access to sources over 
a longer period of time. Another interesting finding is that only three out of the 
74 articles are commentaries. This is relevant because it indicates that very few 
of the journalists who visit the Norwegian military bases actually use their 
personal experiences to reflect upon Norway’s mission in Afghanistan. Such a 
genre is useful in situations were there are no sources willing to present critical 
perspectives since it allows the journalists to nuance the communication 
themselves. In the context of Afghanistan, this could have constituted a highly 
valuable compensation for the strong focus on the Norwegian Armed Forces as 
a source. A nuancing factor with regards to this finding is presented by Einar 
Hagvaag, Dagbladet’s reporter. Havaag explains that he has written many 
commentaries and background stories based on his experiences in Afghanistan, 
but that these have been published later and in a different setting than the 74 
articles. 
Relevant to McCombs’ model of media agenda-setting and Bennett’s 
concept of indexing are also the topics presented in the articles, which relates 
to “what gets into the news”. The quantitative content analysis shows that 27 
out of the 74 articles have the four Norwegian casualties as its key topic. Thus, 
it is the topic with the highest frequency in the sample. This indicates that when 
Norwegian soldiers are killed, the event will dominate the media agenda to a 
large extent, often at the expense of other perspectives. However, when 
considering that as much as 52 or the articles were written in the first to months 
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after the tragic event, one could have expected that the four casualties would 
constitute the key topic in more than one third of the entire sample. This shows 
that though the event had a large impact on the coverage, one should be careful 
with overemphasising its effect on other variables.  
With regards to the other issues communicated in the coverage, it can be 
observed that the security situation, the equipment and personnel of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces and the effects of their mission are given much 
attention both in the news articles as well as in the documentary. These are 
important topics for the Norwegian Armed Forces, because it helps them to 
communicate the significance of sufficient resources, the security situation in 
which the soldiers operate and what they seek to achieve in Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, the topic “other” has a frequency of 10 articles. Included in that 
value are articles addressing the humanitarian perspective and other issues not 
directly related to the military perspective. The low frequency of this value 
illustrates that the coverage to a very limited extent address issues not linked to 
the military aspects of Norway’s presence in Afghanistan. For the 
documentary, slightly more humanitarian perspectives are included, but the 
focus on military objectives is still stronger. This indicates once again that the 
media agenda reflects the story lines of the Norwegian Armed Forces.  
 
6.1.4 Summarising the characteristics of the coverage 
Based on the characteristics of the media agenda analysed in the quantitative 
analysis, it has been argued that several of the ethical norms of journalism are 
left behind when Norwegian journalists visit the Norwegian Armed Forces in 
Afghanistan. This is further supported by the qualitative analysis and answers 
from the semi-structured interviews. These findings confirm the first 
hypothesis of this thesis: “In the artificial “culture” of media visits and 
embedding, the characteristics of the media coverage will show that Norwegian 
journalists leave behind central ethical norms of journalism such as the number 
and diversity of sources, critical perspectives and free flow of information.” 
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In addition, it can be argued that the “diversity of sources”, “range of 
viewpoints” and “what gets into the news” to a large extent reflect the “story 
lines” of the Norwegian Armed Forces. This is in line with Bennett’s concept 
of indexing, and McCombs’ notion of influential sources. According to 
McCombs’ model, the journalistic norms are supposed to filter the 
communication of the source. The discussion provided above has arguably 
shown that the media to a large extent neglect those norms. Combining this 
feature with the dominant role of the Norwegian Armed Forces as a source, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces should be able to communicate their messages. This 
brings the discussion over to the second research question, namely: “To what 
extent does the media coverage fulfil the expressed goals of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces’ communication strategy?”  
 
6.2 Is the communication strategy fulfilled? 
This section will seek to answer the second research question. In order to do so, 
the thesis has deducted four goals from the communication strategy of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces. As we recall, the organisation stresses the 
importance of communicating the mentoring of Afghan security forces, and 
that the Norwegian Armed Forces are in Afghanistan as a part of a larger 
international alliance. Moreover, the strategy states that the tasks and 
competence of the Norwegian soldiers must be communicated. Lastly, it 
emphasises the need to downplay combat actions. The extent to which these 
four goals are fulfilled through the media coverage analysed, will be discussed 
individually. 
 
6.2.1 Mentoring the Afghan security forces 
The statistics from the quantitative content analysis show that the media agenda 
in the 74 articles does not fulfil the goal of communicating the mentorship of 
Afghan security forces. As much as 59 out of the 74 articles do not mention the 
issue at all, and only 4 articles have it as their main focus. Aftenposten’s 
Kristin Solberg informs that when she has been in contact with the Norwegian 
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Armed Forces, “they have been concerned with emphasising the cooperation 
with Afghan and international forces. […] But I don’t know how well this has 
been communicated in Norwegian media.” And as we have seen, Solbergs’ 
scepticism is confirmed by the empirical data from the quantitative content 
analysis. 
However, the goal is met to a much larger extent in the documentary. 
Marius Arnesen agrees that mentoring constitutes an important part of the 
documentary:  
 
The large focus on mentoring is based on reality. It was a huge focus 
from the Norwegian Armed Forces that the Afghan National Army and 
Afghan National Police must be a part of every mission. This also 
caused a lot of frustration among the soldiers. As shown in the 
documentary, they ask themselves, ‘why can’t we just do it ourselves 
and get the job done?’ But Rune Solberg was adamant that the Afghans 
had to do the job. We did not move one foot without the Afghans, so the 
focus on mentoring in the documentary could actually have been even 
greater. 
 
For the NRK-team, it was also a conscious choice to put so much emphasis on 
the mentoring of Afghan forces, explains Arnesen: “This is a part of ISAF’s 
exit-strategy in Afghanistan, and something the Norwegian Armed Forces 
focus a great deal on.” 
 It is evident that the media agenda presented in the articles differs 
greatly from the documentary with regards to mentoring. How can this be 
explained? As we recall, 73 out of the 74 articles were produced by journalists 
on media visits, whereas the documentary was produced by embedded 
journalists. According to the theory, a possible explanation to these findings 
could be that that the ethical norms of journalism are to a larger extent adhered 
to when the journalists are on media visits then when they are embedded. 
However, the analysis of the 74 articles, in which all but one article was 
produced on media visits, shows that also the articles employ few sources with 
limited disparity. There are journalistic constraints with regards to media visits 
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as well, and neutral and positive frames outnumber the critical frames. Thus, 
one needs to look at other factors. 
Arnesen points to an interesting feature when explaining why he chose 
to focus on mentoring: “it is the reality”. The challenge for the Norwegian 
Armed Forces is arguably that this “reality” is only shown to the journalists 
who join the soldiers in combat. In order to join them in combat, the journalists 
have to be embedded. For the journalists who join the media visits however, 
they only get to interview the Norwegian soldiers before they leave for a 
mission, and when they come back. Thus, the cooperation with Afghan forces 
is not shown to the journalists to the same extent. The soldiers may talk about 
it, but the journalists get no first-hand experience, and have no footage of the 
cooperation. Thus, the nature of the media visit as a tool of communication 
could constitute an important cause to why mentoring receives such limited 
attention in the articles.  
However, it is important to take into account a nuancing factor with 
regards to the articles. Much of the focus in the articles is directed at the four 
Norwegian casualties, thus making a “narrow” perspective, such as the 
Norwegian mentorship, less communicated. It can be argued that if the 
Norwegian Armed Forces had not actively set out to communicate this issue, it 
had not been covered at all. In that perspective, the total of 15 articles that 
either mention the mentorship, or has it as its main focus, is not a terrible result 
for the Norwegian Armed Forces. Having commented this, it can still be 
argued that the communication goal is not fulfilled by the articles analysed, and 
that the media agenda communicated in the articles on this issue does not 
reflect the dominant role of the Norwegian Armed Forces as a source.  
 
6.2.2 The importance of a broad international effort 
The second aim of the Norwegian Armed Forces is to communicate the 
importance of a broad international effort with regards to Norway’s mission in 
Afghanistan. Based on the empirical data presented, it can be argued that they 
have been partially successful in communicating this issue. It is described in 
81 
almost half of the 74 articles. However, it is the main focus in only three 
articles. As described when the results were presented, the issue is often 
communicated through descriptions of how the different members of the 
alliance work together and support each other. Such descriptions are useful and 
factual pieces of information, and may be included to provide depth to an 
article. This may explain why it is mentioned fairly often in the articles, but 
seldom the main focus. Another explanation to why the issue is not given more 
attention in the articles is that the Norwegian Armed Forces do not 
communicate it clearly enough. Rune Thomas Ege has been in Afghanistan 
both as a journalist and press officer, and is surprised to see that this is a stated 
goal within the Norwegian Armed Forces: “I have never heard much about the 
‘alliance argument’ from the Armed Forces. From the politicians, yes. From 
the army, no. The cooperation with other ISAF countries is also less 
emphasised by the Norwegian army compared to other allies.”   
However, the issue is more prominent in the documentary, where many 
of the scenes portray Rune Solberg cooperating with his allied colleagues. 
Arnesen explains why he thinks this is so strongly communicated in “Norge i 
krig”: “We got the opportunity to show a side of the Norwegian Armed Forces 
I did not know we had. They are competent soldiers with individual skills who 
work closely with the Americans and the Afghan security forces […].” Once 
again, we see that it may be the method of embedding that increases the focus 
on an issue the Norwegian Armed Forces seek to communicate.  
Although the qualitative analysis shows that the international effort 
receives much more focus in the documentary, both the empirical data from the 
quantitative analysis, and the critical statements regarding the communication 
made by the Norwegian Armed Forces, indicate that the organisation has not 
been sufficiently active in their communication of this issue. Moreover, 
because the communication goal is only fulfilled to some extent, the dominant 
role of the Norwegian Armed Forces as a news source is only partially 
reflected in the media agenda on this issue. 
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6.2.3 Tasks and competence of the Norwegian Armed Forces 
The third goal of the Norwegian Armed Forces is to promote the tasks and 
competence of the Norwegian troops. According to the statistics from the 74 
articles, this issue is highly salient in the media agenda presented. Being the 
main focus in 8 articles, and mentioned in 50, the goal is well fulfilled through 
the coverage. One explanation to why it is given so much attention can be the 
emphasis the Norwegian Armed Forces put on the issue. Kristin Solberg 
confirms that the tasks and competence are “much communicated” by the 
Norwegian Armed Forces. Another explanation can be that the journalists are 
surprised by the competence they meet in Afghanistan. Rune Thomas Ege 
states that:  
 
I think the tasks and competence is well communicated through the 
media. Many of the journalists visiting the Norwegian bases in 
Afghanistan for the first time have an image of the soldiers as ‘rookies’. 
But when they arrive at the bases, they see that the soldiers are skilled, 
young men with experience. 
 
As quoted in the discussion on the communication of the international effort, 
Marius Arnesen was one of the journalists who were impressed by what they 
saw: “We got the opportunity to show a side of the Norwegian Armed Forces I 
did not know we had.” 
With regards to the focus on the tasks and competence of the soldiers in 
the documentary, it is once again even greater than in the articles. As we 
remember, a scene in the first episode zooms in on Rune Solberg’s slide that 
states: “PRT are very well prepared. PRT are ready to take over the 
responsibility in Afghanistan!”. The audience is on several occasions reminded 
of the lack of competence within the Afghan security forces, and how the 
Norwegians can assist them in planning missions, reading coordinates and 
executing operations.  
Thus, and in sum, it can be argued that the coverage fulfils this goal of 
the communication strategy, indicating that the dominant role of the news 
source is reflected in the media agenda communicated. 
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6.2.4 Downplay combat action 
Finally, the Norwegian Armed Forces state in their communication strategy 
that too much focus on combat action can “counteract the goals of the ISAF-
operation”. Based on the analysis of the 74 articles and the documentary, it can 
be concluded that combat action constitutes a substantial part of the media 
agenda presented from Afghanistan. It is the main focus in 12 of the 74 articles, 
and mentioned in 34 of them.  Moreover, combat action receives considerable 
attention in the documentary.  
Evidently, the Norwegian Armed forces have not been successful in 
downplaying combat action. The finding, however, is not surprising. First, it 
can be argued that the four Norwegian casualties resulted in a strong focus on 
the combat the soldiers where involved in. Yet, there is another feature that 
may be even more suitable in explaining the emphasis on combat action. Rune 
Thomas Ege explains: “Avoiding focus on combat is a lost case. Every 
journalist will ask about combat.” Thus, it is a matter of principle, and it can be 
argued that combat action is an issue where the news norms in fact are present. 
Combat is such an important and controversial issue that the Norwegian 
journalists are adamant about reporting on it. This is further confirmed by Einar 
Hagvaag. He argues that the topic is given so much focus because combat is a 
controversial issue in the Norwegian political debate, and “will always be 
reported on”.  
Combat action is even more frequently communicated in the 
documentary where the journalists actually joined the Norwegian soldiers in 
combat. And interestingly, compared to the articles, this focus is not related to 
the four Norwegian casualties. As Sømme Hammer states: “Any journalist who 
becomes a witness to combat will report on that.” NRK-journalist Marius 
Arnesen also comments that combat is a natural thing to communicate when 
trying to tell the story about the Norwegian soldiers’ lives in Afghanistan. He 
sees the goal of downplaying combat as somewhat of a paradox:  
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They want to be more open, but also to tone down the communication of 
combat. I have a lot of sources in the army, and I know that combat 
action has increased significantly. Despite their stated goal of being 
more open, combat action is never communicated in press releases. 
  
The empirical data show that even though the Norwegian Armed Forces try to 
tone down the focus on combat, they are not successful. They fail to move the 
attention of the journalists over to other topics, in order to limit the focus on 
combat in the media agenda. One could argue that the fascinating and dramatic 
nature of combat increases the journalists’ interest in such issues. In support of 
this argument are findings revealing that media has a tendency to employ 
“violent” frames (McCombs 2004:113). Another potential explanation is that 
the focus on combat is a consequence of the four casualties. However, this does 
not apply to the documentary since it was produced both before and after the 
casualties and sets very little focus on the event. This leaves us with a third 
explanation, one that is supported by both the content analyses and the 
interviews: Despite the fact that the journalists leave behind some of their 
journalistic norms and ideals, this does not apply to such a controversial issue 
as Norwegian soldiers in combat.  
 
6.2.5 Summarising the fulfilment of the communication strategy 
The discussion above has argued that the intended messages of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces are reflected in the media agenda only to a certain extent. We 
have seen that in the 74 articles, the tasks and competence of the soldiers is 
highly salient. With regards to the Norwegian forces operating in Afghanistan 
as a part of a larger international effort, this is also communicated, though not 
as strongly. Combat is, in contrast to the expressed goal in the communication 
strategy, very much communicated in the articles. Mentoring of Afghan forces 
is on occasion communicated, but arguably not nearly as much as the 
Norwegian Armed Forces would have wanted. With regards to the 
documentary “Norge i krig”, the communication goals are fulfilled to a larger 
extent. Mentoring is the key object in almost every episode, the tasks and 
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competence of the soldiers are clearly communicated, and the role of NATO 
and ISAF is more prominent than in the articles. The only goal not fulfilled is 
the downplaying of combat action.  
Supplementing the findings from the quantitative content analysis with 
the qualitative analysis and the semi-structured interviews, we see that the 
empirical data in large confirm the second hypothesis: “When the journalists in 
large depend on official information, issues such as tasks, competence, and the 
role of the international effort are fulfilled by the coverage. However, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces fail to downplay combat action and fail to 
communicate the more specific goal of mentoring the Afghan forces.”  
Although the hypothesis is confirmed on most issues, the strong focus 
on mentoring of Afghan forces in the documentary shows that the hypothesis is 
not fully fulfilled in the context of embedding. Another contradicting result is 
the limited focus on the international effort in the articles compared to the 
documentary. These nuancing findings will be addressed in chapter 6.3. 
Based on the discussion of the coverage provided in this chapter, the 
nature of the communication strategy can now be addressed. Drawing upon 
Grunig’s notion of symmetrical and asymmetrical strategies, Schiager has 
argued that the Norwegian Armed Forces employ a two way asymmetric 
model (2011:92-93). The empirical data collected here indicate otherwise. 
First, it can be observed that the prevailing role of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces as a source results in a mainly unilateral communication, or “one way 
communication” to use Grunig’s term. Moreover, while the Norwegian Armed 
Forces benefit from the communication, the discussion has shown that the 
media benefit as well. The Norwegian journalists, to a large extent, depend on 
the Norwegian Armed Forces’ facilitation to actually witness the war in 
Afghanistan. Thus, it can be argued that the communication strategy of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces for Afghanistan 2011 is a one way symmetric 
strategy. However, the media benefit from the communication only if they 
manage to maintain the trust of the readers through critical reporting. Allern 
states that when the media accept information on the terms of the military 
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organisation, it will undermine the trust the audience have in the journalists’ 
loyalty towards them (1997:218). Without that trust, the media jeopardize their 
position as a “watch dog” on behalf of the public. Such a situation is highly 
problematic for any newsroom, and is in conflict with “Vær varsom-plakaten” 
(Norsk Presseforbund 2005). Thus, it is crucial for the media to maintain a 
critical and independent perspective on the Norwegian Armed Forces when 
visiting their bases. The data presented here indicate that this is not always 
adhered to.  
 Related to the nature of the communication strategy, is the degree of 
openness within the Norwegian Armed Forces. It is a stated goal in the 
strategy to achieve the “greatest support possible for the Norwegian Armed 
Forces in the Norwegian public through as open, timely and honest 
information […]” (Norwegian Armed Forces 2011).  Based on the statements 
made by the interviewees discussed earlier in the thesis, it is evident that this 
openness is not always practiced. Petter Lindqvist confirms in the interview 
that the ideal of openness is not shared by everyone in the Norwegian Armed 
Forces:  
 
Many of the decision-makers within the organisation have been here 
since the fall of the Berlin wall. As late as the 1990’s we never 
informed about missions involving combat. A natural reaction is that 
the combat we experience today must be kept out of the media. This 
makes it difficult to be open about what we do.  
 
The tendency to keep information within the organisation, combined with 
media’s dependence on the arrangements offered by the Norwegian Armed 
Forces, will arguably increase the definitional power of the official sources. 
For the media, it will not be possible to cover something they have no 
knowledge about. Moreover, an increase in the definitional power should 
further strengthen the sources’ potential to influence the media agenda as 
described by McCombs’ model and Bennett’s notion of indexing.  
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6.3 What are the implications for the media-state relation? 
The discussion provided so far has addressed the two empirical research 
questions of this thesis. The scope will now be widened to a more generic 
discussion that seeks to answer the third research question: “What do the 
empirical findings say about the media-state relation, and what are the 
theoretical implications for the academic debate?”. 
Lance Bennett and Herman and Chomsky argue that the media produce 
“officialised news” when it comes to important issues such as foreign policy 
and warfare (Bennett 1994:23). This notion of media-state relations is widely 
supported by numerous seminal studies. Hallin’s research on the Vietnam War, 
together with a wide range of studies conducted on domestic and international 
conflicts, all show that reporters turn to official sources when covering a 
conflict (Bennett 1994:23-24). This is in line with Herman and Chomsky’s 
propaganda model. Moreover, research indicates that the dominance of official 
sources “is even more pronounced in national security stories than for the news 
as a whole” (Bennett 1994:23). Looking at the Norwegian context in general, 
this argument is supported by how the press historically have complied with 
Norwegian security policies (Ottosen 2009; Thune et. al. 2006). 
This thesis has drawn upon the theoretical framework provided by 
McCombs’ theory of media agenda-setting in order to increase our 
understanding of the media coverage and the relationship between the media 
and the Norwegian Armed Forces as an official source. In addition, Bennett’s 
theory of indexing has been employed to sophisticate the discussion. These are 
dominant theories with regards to media-state relations. McCombs argues that 
official sources have a significant impact on the media agenda communicated, 
but that news norms are even more influential and can filter some of the 
communication made by the source. According to Bennett’s notion of indexing, 
media tend to reflect the attitudes and story lines of governmental officials, or 
military leaders in the context of this thesis. Are these historically dominant 
notions reflected in the coverage produced in Afghanistan by Norwegian 
journalists? Only to a certain extent. 
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Yes, we see that in the setting of Afghanistan, Norwegian journalists 
depend heavily on official sources. The statistics from the variables regarding 
the number and type of sources indicate that it is the sources from the 
Norwegian Armed Forces who dominate the media agenda produced on both 
media visits and while embedded. Being the most dominant voice, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces are also given the opportunity to influence the 
content of the media agenda. This results in a coverage that may be labelled 
officialised news, because it is mainly the official stories that are 
communicated by the Norwegian media. This is also in line with the 
Norwegian tradition of a “consensus-oriented foreign policy” where the media 
adhere to the perceptions and arguments of the official sources (Thune et. al. 
2006:211-212). 
However, the discussion provided so far has also shown that the 
dominant role of the Norwegian Armed Forces as a source has not resulted in a 
media agenda as favourable to the organisation as expected by the theories 
applied. One of the most intriguing findings of this thesis is that the content 
seems to be indexed only on certain issues. What is written is largely a 
reflection of the official arguments, but some of the official perspectives are 
also left out of the coverage. This is interesting because it seems to unveil an 
inconsistency that arguably cannot be explained without further investigation. 
One example is how the 74 articles analysed do reflect the Norwegian Armed 
Forces’ “story line” of the tasks and competence of the soldiers, but at the same 
time neglects the “story line” of mentoring. Moreover, the articles are only to 
some extent indexed in terms of the importance of the broad international effort 
in Afghanistan, and neither the articles nor the documentary are indexed in 
terms of downplaying combat action.  
Thus, we see that the well established concepts of Bennett and Herman 
and Chomsky are only partially confirmed by the coverage. The Norwegian 
Armed Forces are successful in some of its communication, and the coverage 
reflects many of their views, but they still fail on some crucial aspects. How 
can this be explained? One approach to finding an answer is looking to the 
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overarching theoretical framework of the thesis, namely McCombs’ “onion” of 
media agenda-setting. According to McCombs’ model, the news norms will 
have a larger impact on the media agenda than the news sources. The thesis has 
not set out to study causality, but following this line of argument the ethical 
norms of Norwegian journalists could be a potential explanation to why the 
Norwegian Armed Forces have not been successful in communicating all of 
their goals.  
Looking at one of the big failures of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ 
communication, namely the strong focus on combat action in the coverage, this 
may be explained by McCombs’ “news norms”-factor. Though it could be 
argued that the focus on combat is a result of the four Norwegian casualties, 
this explanation fails when taking into account that the salience of combat 
action is even higher in the documentary produced independently of the four 
casualties, than in the articles. An explanation that fits both the articles and the 
documentary, and also emphasised by the interviewees, is the reluctance within 
the media to “cover up” combat. This indicates that when the real controversial 
issues are brought up, the ethical norms of journalism do kick in. Thus, we see 
that the ethical norms of journalism may have counteracted the Norwegian 
Armed Forces’ communication of this issue. This is in line with McCombs’ 
model, but the explanation arguably has consequences for the notion of 
indexing. The findings indicate that when the ethical norms of journalism are 
brought into play, the media do not reflect the “story line” of the official 
sources, and the indexing-hypothesis fails. Bennett do recognise the role of 
journalistic norms, but attributes limited influence to the ethical norms of 
journalism when arguing that oppositional perspectives are presented only 
when there is a debate within the official circles (Bennett 1994:24). The debate 
regarding the Norwegian mission in Afghanistan has been limited within the 
official circles, due to the broad consensus in parliament regarding the 
Norwegian effort (Ottosen 2009:37). Although a public debate emerged in the 
aftermath of the four Norwegian casualties (Fondenes 2011), it was arguably 
not a dominant debate within the official circles. Thus, it can be argued that the 
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theory of indexing should attribute more importance to the potential influence 
of the ethical norms of journalism. This is an argument also supported by the 
U.S.-Libya case-study referred to in chapter 3.2.3 (Althaus et. al. 1996). 
When looking beyond the context of combat action, however, the study 
has shown that many of the ethical norms of journalism – such as diversity of 
sources, critical approach, journalistic independence and free flow of 
information – are to a large extent left behind when journalists join media visits 
or let themselves embed. McCombs explains that the importance of news 
norms will vary from culture to culture. When it can be observed that the 
ethical norms of journalism are not generally adhered to in “the Norwegian 
culture” of being embedded or on media visits, it will on most issues be 
erroneous to assume that such norms will have a stronger influence on the 
media agenda, than the news source.  
So, what factors can explain the Norwegian Armed Forces’ failure to 
communicate the importance of mentoring in the 74 articles? All but one of 
these articles was written by journalists on media visits. Looking at the 
documentary produced by embedded journalists, it fulfils the goal to a large 
extent. The discrepancy between the two samples can be a result of the fact that 
57 of the articles were written in the immediate aftermath of the four casualties. 
But based on the analysis provided, the answers given by the interviewees, and 
the fact that the four Norwegian casualties constituted the key topic in “only” 
27 out of the 74 articles, it can just as well be argued that it was the media 
visits, as a tool of communication, that played a decisive role in the failure of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces to communicate the mentorship. Solberg, Ege, 
Hammer and Hagvaag all agree that embedding is a more efficient tool for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces to employ in their communication then media visits. 
Petter Lindqvist concurs: “The coverage produced by embedded journalists 
fulfils the goals of our strategy to a larger extent, because the journalism is 
more thorough and goes deeper.” This factor could also explain the findings 
that went against the hypotheses, namely that the issue of mentoring was well 
communicated in the documentary made by embedded reporters, and that the 
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importance of a broad international effort was not communicated to a larger 
extent by the articles.  
Furthermore, Rune Thomas Ege emphasises the lack of efficiency in 
the communication conducted by the Norwegian Armed Forces: ”They should 
be more proactive in their communication from Afghanistan to Norway. That 
would benefit the Norwegian Armed Forces.” Ege also argues that the army 
“depends too much on the individual press officers”, have too few tools 
available, and are limited in their use of social media. This notion is 
strengthened by the responses to the survey conducted with 500 journalists. 
When asked to rate the availability of the Norwegian Armed Forces on a scale 
from 1 to 6, most of the journalists (39 per cent) gave them a score of 3 
(Respons Analyse 2011).  
Petter Lindqvist admits that the Norwegian Armed Forces need to 
improve their communication:  
 
We have a long way to go before we can be satisfied with how our 
communication goals are fulfilled. […] We must look at alternative 
tools of communication. We must to a larger extent make material from 
Afghanistan available to the journalists back home in Norway, and this 
must be on their terms. Among other things we are trying to give access 
to more audio-visual material from Afghanistan.  
 
This aspect is also emphasised in the communication strategy, which states 
that: “Video and images from the theatre must be made available, as well as 
comments when requested” (Norwegian Armed Forces 2011). 
Based on the empirical data, as well as the statements above, it can be 
argued that many of the problems facing the Norwegian Armed Forces in 
communicating their messages lie within the military itself. The organisation is 
not sufficiently efficient, precise and sophisticated in their communication on 
certain issues. This is particularly evident with regards to media visits as a tool 
of communication. While one should be cautious with generalising outside the 
context of this study, the empirical findings can provide some interesting 
perspectives to the theoretical debate regarding the media-state relationship.  
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It has already been argued that Bennett’s theory of indexing should to a 
larger extent acknowledge the potential influence of the ethical norms of 
journalism. With regards to McCombs’ model of media agenda-setting, it does 
not address the nature and quality of the communication made by the sources. 
Instead, McCombs include the norms and traditions of journalism as a 
nuancing factor when explaining the success or failure of a news source in 
communicating its message (McCombs 2004:105). The empirical data indicate 
that both the quality of communication and the news norms should be included 
when seeking to explain the process of how a media agenda is created. This 
arguably constitutes a shortcoming of McCombs’ “onion” of media agenda-
setting. Moreover, the argument that the quality of communication should be 
included as a factor is also supported by one of Bennett’s assumptions referred 
to in chapter 3.2, which states that “the growing sophistication of press 
management techniques” will make some officials more successful than others 
in creating “favourable media framings” (Bennett 1994:29).  
In sum, we see that the research results presented in the thesis confirms 
parts of McCombs’ theory of media agenda-setting and parts of Bennett’s 
theory of indexing. Yet, due to the fact that both of the theories have their 
shortcomings, their explanatory strength would arguably increase by drawing 
upon each other. This finding confirms the third hypothesis, which states that: 
“The empirical findings are expected to show that the media reflect the 
opinions of the sources only to a certain extent. Hence, it is necessary to open 
for a discussion of the established theories of media-state relations, and the 
extent to which they cover all relevant factors.”  
Based on the findings provided by this study, it is argued that in its 
layer of news sources, McCombs’ onion should include a modifying factor 
related to the sophistication, quality and precision of the communication 
conducted by the source. Moreover, Bennett’s theory of indexing should to a 
larger extent acknowledge the potential filter-effect inherent in the ethical 
norms of journalism. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
 
The characteristics of the coverage analysed in this thesis have shown how the 
journalists leave behind several of the ethical norms of journalism when 
visiting the Norwegian Armed Forces in Afghanistan. When comparing the 
media agenda to the messages the Norwegian Armed Forces seek to 
communicate, it has been argued that the agenda reflects or “index” much of 
the “story lines” of the Norwegian military. Yet, the Norwegian Armed Forces 
have not been successful in fulfilling all of their communication goals. These 
findings are in line with the two first hypotheses presented in the introduction. 
In a more generic perspective, the analysis has shown that although the 
media agenda does communicate “officialised news” to the public, there are 
some nuancing factors present. While it was not the aim of this thesis to infer 
causality, it has been argued that the theories of McCombs and Bennett need 
revising in order to increase their explanatory power with regards to media-
state relations. This is in line with the third hypothesis of the thesis. It has in 
particular been argued that McCombs’ “onion” of media agenda-setting would 
benefit from incorporating the quality of the communication made by the 
sources, as a factor.  
An interesting finding from a Norwegian perspective is that it appears 
that the Norwegian Armed Forces’ communication strategy functions as a “one 
way symmetrical strategy”. But the media will only benefit from the 
relationship if they maintain the trust of their readers. If they wish to maintain 
that trust, they must uphold an independent and critical media agenda. The 
empirical data have shown that this is not always achieved in the reporting 
produced in Afghanistan today. Thus, the Norwegian media should increase 
their awareness of how they report. 
For the Norwegian Armed Forces, the findings indicate that some of 
their failures of communication can be attributed to a lack of sophistication in 
tools and strategy. Thus, if they wish to increase their level of success, they 
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should to a larger extent employ embedding as a tool of communication. They 
may also utilise other platforms of communication, such as facilitating visual 
material from Afghanistan, and be more pro-active in promoting specific 
issues. 
For future research, it will be possible to conduct a similar study as the 
one provided here, but with the latter part of 2011 included in the sample. This 
would be valuable because a larger sample could provide results with even 
greater prospects of generalisation. Furthermore, it would be interesting to 
study the audience effects of the media agenda analysed here, as well as the 
subsequent consequences for the Norwegian Armed Forces and the policies of 
the Norwegian government.  
This being said, the thesis has provided new insight regarding the role of 
the ethical norms of journalism and the quality of communication when 
explaining the intricate process of media agenda-setting. Furthermore, it is the 
hope that this knowledge will be found valuable to the larger debate on media-
state relations in the “theatre of war”. 
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Appendix 
 
A Interview guide journalists 
 
General strategy 
 
1. What du you think are the most important goals in the communication strategy of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces for Afghanistan 2011? 
 
2. In your opinion, what kind of tools do they employ to fulfil these goals?  
 
3. In your opinion, to what extent are the Norwegian Armed Forces successful in 
fulfilling the goals? 
 
 
“Media-visits” 
 
4. What are the aims of the Norwegian Armed Forces when inviting to media visits? 
 
5. Who finances the trips? 
 
6. What stories do you search for on media visits? 
 
7. Are there any restrictions on media visits? 
 
8. What kind of relationship do you get with the soldiers when you live with them? 
 
9. To what extent do you think the coverage produced on media visits fulfils the goals 
of the communication strategy? 
 
 
Embedding 
 
10. In your opinion, when did the Norwegian Armed Forces start embedding 
journalists? 
 
11. How do you define being embedded? 
 
12. What are the aims of the Norwegian Armed Forces when embedding journalists? 
 
13. To what extent do you think the coverage produced on media visits fulfils the 
goals of the communication strategy? 
 
14. Have you been embedded?  
 
If yes: 
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15. Was it on tour initiative, or the initiative of the Norwegian Armed Forces? 
 
16. Who financed the trip? 
 
17. What stories do you search for when being embedded? 
 
18. Are there any restrictions when embedded? 
 
19. What kind of relationship do you get with the soldiers when you join them I 
combat? 
 
 
General about trips with the Norwegian Armed Forces in Afghanistan 
 
20. To what extent are Norwegian journalists dependent on these trips to cover the 
war? 
 
21. Do these visits affect the coverage in any way? 
 
22. Are these kinds of trips on the expense of other perspectives and sources?  
 
23. Do Norwegian newsrooms supplement such visits with independent trips to 
Afghanistan? 
 
24. Are journalists as conscious with regards to the relationship to sources, disparity 
of sources and critical perspectives on such trips as in journalism in general?  
 
25. What can Norwegian media do to improve their coverage of Afghanistan? 
 
 
B Interview guide Norwegian Armed Forces 
 
General strategy 
1. Why do the Norwegian Armed Forces have a communication strategy? 
2. What is the essence of the communication strategy? 
3. How conscious is the Norwegian Armed Forces with regards to the strategy? 
4. What do the Norwegian Armed Forces do to fulfil the goals of the strategy? 
5. In your opinion, to what extent do you fulfil the goals? 
6. Does the strategy have any negative consequences? 
7. Does the strategy have a potential of improvement? 
 
Media visits 
8. How ling have Norwegian Armed Forces invited to media visits? 
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9. How do the Norwegian Armed Forces define media visits? 
10. In your opinion, to what extent does the coverage produced on media visits fulfil 
the goals of the strategy? 
11. What resources do the Norwegian Armed Forces invest in these visits? 
12. What restrictions apply on media visits? 
13. To what extent do Norwegian journalists depend on these visits to cover the war? 
 
Embedding 
14. When did the Norwegian Armed Forces start embedding journalists? 
15. How do the Norwegian Armed Forces define embedding? 
16. In your opinion, to what extent does the coverage produced on while embedded 
fulfil the goals of the strategy? 
17. What resources do the Norwegian Armed Forces invest in embedding? 
18. Are the Norwegian Armed Forces satisfied with the tool? 
19. What restrictions apply when embedded? 
 
General about trips with the Norwegian Armed Forces in Afghanistan 
20. How would you describe the relationship between the Norwegian Aremd Forces 
and the journalists on these visits? 
21. Are you confronted with critical questions by journalists on these trips? 
22. Do Norwegian newsrooms supplement such visits with independent trips? 
 
Media’s coverage 
23. What do the Norwegian Armed Forces think about the coverage? 
24. To what extent do the coverage correlate with the coverage you seek? 
 
C Interviewees 
 
Rune Thomas Ege: Reports for VG, and has been in Afghanistan on numerous trips 
as a journalist. Ege has also worked as a press officer in Afghanistan in 2008. I met 
Ege at his office, which allowed for a personal encounter lasting for more than an 
hour. 
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Einar Hagvaag: Experienced reporter in Dagbladet on foreign affairs. Hagvaag has 
for many years covered armed conflicts in Europe, Latin America, Middle East and in 
Asia. Hagvaag has also reported from Afghanistan independent of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces. Hagvaag was able to meet me in person, and the interview lasted for 
more than an hour. 
  
Kristin Solberg: South Asia-correspondent for Aftenposten living in Kabul. Winner 
of the International Reporter-award at the “SKUP”-conference in 2011. Because 
Solberg lives in Kabul, I had to interview her on Skype. The internet connection in 
Kabul is not perfect, so we had some occasional problems with understanding each 
other. On those occasions I repeated the questions, and the problem was solved. 
 
Marius Arnesen: Video-journalist for NRK. Arnesen was one of three journalists 
from NRK who was embedded with the Norwegian Armed Forces in the making of 
the documentary “Norge i krig”. I met Arnesen at his office, and the interview lasted 
for more than an hour. 
 
Anders Sømme Hammer: Independent journalist living in Kabul. Sømme Hammer 
has worked for several Norwegian media outlets, such as NRK, Aftenposten and 
Dagbladet. Because Anders Sømme Hammer lives in Kabul, I had to interview him 
over the phone. The connection was good and we talked for over an hour. 
 
Petter Hallvard Foght Lindqvist: Chief of communication at the Norwegian Joint 
Headquarters of the Norwegian Armed Forces. Petter Lindqvist travels a lot, and I 
chose to do the interview over the phone so that the progress of the thesis did not 
suffer. This turned out to be unproblematic, because he put everything aside, and 
devoted his attention to the interviews. Also, because I had more questions to him 
than to the journalists, the interview was longer. As a consequence, I interviewed him 
on three occasions. 
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D Coding manual for the quantitative content analysis 
Variable Description 
Type of sources 
 
 
 
The type of sources will be analysed on 
the following values: 1) military or 
police, 2) politicians, 3) humanitarian 
representatives, 4) scholars, 5) civilians 
and 6) the Taliban or war-lords 
Number of sources 
 
 
The number of sources will be counted in 
each article. Anonymous sources will 
also be included, because though 
anonymous, they still constitute a view 
referred to in the article. 
Framing 
 
 
This variable has three values; 1) 
positive, 2) neutral, 3) critical.  
If the article is framed through a critical 
statement, it will be categorised as a 
“critical” frame. If the article addresses a 
problem within the Norwegian Armed 
Forces, or asks critical questions 
regarding the mission, its results or the 
behaviour of the soldiers, it is also 
critical. On the other hand, if the article 
focus on the positive effects of the 
Norwegian mission or similar, it will be 
coded as “positive”. If an article employs 
neither a positive or critical frame, or 
balances both perspectives, it will be 
coded as “neutral”. 
Genre 
 
 
 
 
The values for this variable are 1) news 
article, 2) interview, 3) reportage, 4) 
feature, 5) comment/background and 6) 
other.   
“News articles” present news regarding a 
certain topic, and focus on that issue. An 
“interview” is typically based on one 
personal interview, does not include 
other perspective than the ones presented 
by the interviewee, and the journalist 
does not provide any observations or 
impressions. A “reportage” can be 
defined as “a personal account based on 
the reporter’s own observations” (Bech-
Karlsen 2002:147), connected to news 
and events. Closely related to the 
reportage is the “feature”. Feature is here 
understood as a genre that goes further 
than the reportage, where the journalist 
uses more of her own observations and 
“moves beyond the immediate event to 
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provide the larger perspectives and 
stories” (Hvid 2002:83). Reportage and 
feature are coded as two different genres 
in order to deepen our understanding of 
how much time and resources are 
invested in the articles. 
“Comment/background” is here 
understood as a reflective piece where 
the journalist expresses her personal 
views on a topic. 
Topic of article 
 
 
 
This variable address the one key topic 
presented by an article, and includes the 
values 1) effects of the Norwegian effort 
2) combat actions, 3) casualties, 4) the 
everyday-life of the Norwegian soldiers 
5) equipment and personnel 6) security-
situation and 8) other. 
The value “effects of the Norwegian 
effort” includes both the positive and 
negative effects with regards to the 
security situation, the Afghan security 
forces, the civilians or similar. “Combat 
actions” and “casualties” are two 
separate variables because the casualties 
can be the main topic without addressing 
the combat-action to the same extent, and 
vice versa. The value “equipment and 
personnel” relates to articles addressing 
the resources of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces. “Everyday-life” includes stories 
from within the Norwegian bases that do 
not address the soldiers’ military tasks. 
The value “other” will include all other 
topics, such as the humanitarian 
situation. 
Month  The articles will be coded in terms of 
which month they were published. 
Newspaper The articles will be coded in terms of 
which newspaper they have been 
published in. 
Mentoring The articles communicating the 
mentorship include those who either 
describe the mission of mentoring in 
specific, describe how the Norwegian 
and Afghan forces cooperate, or merely 
describe the effects of the mentoring. 
The variable will be measured on the 
values 1) no, 2) mentioned and 3) main 
focus, depending on the salience of the 
issue throughout the article. 
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International effort  The articles communicating the 
importance of a broad international effort 
include those who address Norway’s 
membership in NATO as a precondition 
for the mission in Afghanistan, describe 
the conflict as a NATO-mission or 
describe the cooperation with other 
ISAF-countries. The variable will be 
measured on the values 1) no, 2) 
mentioned and 3) main focus, depending 
on the salience of the issue throughout 
the article. 
Tasks and competence This variable measures if an article 
describes the daily tasks of the soldier, 
how the soldiers have trained to be 
prepared for the mission in Afghanistan, 
or the general competence inherent in 
PRT 15. The variable will be measured 
on the values 1) no, 2) mentioned and 3) 
main focus, depending on the salience of 
the issue throughout the article. 
 
Combat The articles will be measured on 
addressing combat-action as either 1) no, 
2) mentioned and 3) main focus, 
depending on the salience of the issue 
throughout the article. If an article 
mentions the four casualties without 
referring to the actual combat action, it 
will not as “no”. This will provide a 
more accurate picture of how many 
articles actually describe combat action. 
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E Frequency tables.  
 
 
Number_sources 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0 2 2.7 2.7 2.7 
1 16 21.6 21.6 24.3 
2 21 28.4 28.4 52.7 
3 17 23.0 23.0 75.7 
4 7 9.5 9.5 85.1 
5 5 6.8 6.8 91.9 
6 2 2.7 2.7 94.6 
7 1 1.4 1.4 95.9 
8 1 1.4 1.4 97.3 
9 1 1.4 1.4 98.6 
11 1 1.4 1.4 100.0 
Total 74 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Framing 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Neutral 42 56.8 56.8 56.8 
Positive 14 18.9 18.9 75.7 
Critical 18 24.3 24.3 100.0 
Total 74 100.0 100.0  
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Genre 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Comment/ 
Background 
3 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Feature 3 4.1 4.1 8.1 
Interview 11 14.9 14.9 23.0 
Newsarticle 21 28.4 28.4 51.4 
Reportage 36 48.6 48.6 100.0 
Total 74 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Topic 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Norwegian casualty 27 36.5 36.5 36.5 
Combat 7 9.5 9.5 45.9 
Effects of Norwegian 
mission 
9 12.2 12.2 58.1 
Equipment/personell 6 8.1 8.1 66.2 
Everyday-life 1 1.4 1.4 67.6 
Other 10 13.5 13.5 81.1 
Security-situation 14 18.9 18.9 100.0 
Total 74 100.0 100.0  
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Month 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid June 2010 23 31.1 31.1 31.1 
July 2010 29 39.2 39.2 70.3 
August 2010 3 4.1 4.1 74.3 
September 2010 1 1.4 1.4 75.7 
October 2010 6 8.1 8.1 83.8 
November 2010 1 1.4 1.4 85.1 
December 2010 3 4.1 4.1 89.2 
January 2011 1 1.4 1.4 90.5 
February 2011 1 1.4 1.4 91.9 
April 2011 2 2.7 2.7 94.6 
June 2011 4 5.4 5.4 100.0 
Total 74 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
Newspaper 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Aftenposten 19 25.7 25.7 25.7 
Alfa 6 8.1 8.1 33.8 
Dagbladet 13 17.6 17.6 51.4 
Nordlys 4 5.4 5.4 56.8 
NTB 10 13.5 13.5 70.3 
VG 22 29.7 29.7 100.0 
Total 74 100.0 100.0  
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Mentoring 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Main focus 4 5.4 5.4 5.4 
Mentioned 11 14.9 14.9 20.3 
No 59 79.7 79.7 100.0 
Total 74 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
International_effort 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Main focus 3 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Mentioned 30 40.5 40.5 44.6 
No 41 55.4 55.4 100.0 
Total 74 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Tasks_Competence 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Main focus 8 10.8 10.8 10.8 
Mentioned 50 67.6 67.6 78.4 
No 16 21.6 21.6 100.0 
Total 74 100.0 100.0  
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Combat 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Main focus 12 16.2 16.2 16.2 
Mentioned 34 45.9 45.9 62.2 
No 28 37.8 37.8 100.0 
Total 74 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
